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QUIETING THE COURT: LESSONS FROM THE MUSLIM-BAN CASE 
Avidan Y. Cover* 
The Supreme Court’s Muslim-ban decision in Trump v. Hawaii 
calls into question the civil rights litigation enterprise insofar as 
lawsuits challenge the U.S. government’s injurious national security 
and immigration policies. Litigants and advocacy organizations 
should employ an array of strategies and tactics to avoid the Court’s 
rulings that almost uniformly defer to, and thus validate, the 
government’s national security and immigration practices. 
This article maintains that The Muslim-Ban Case was a 
predictable outgrowth of the Supreme Court’s national security-
immigration jurisprudence that champions executive power at the 
expense of marginalized groups, in particular non-citizens. The 
article provides a typology of these cases’ features and examines 
how The Muslim-Ban Case exhibits these same characteristics but 
also exceeds recent precedents in its disregard of the ban’s bigoted 
motivations and its excessive deference to the President.   
In light of The Muslim-Ban Case and the judiciary’s 
conservative trajectory, this article proposes that civil rights 
lawyers and legal advocacy organizations assess whether their 
litigation risks validating the President’s arrogation of power and 
the concomitant suppression of minority groups’ liberties. 
Recognizing the at-times life-saving and moral necessity of 
litigation, this article first offers discrete litigation strategies that 
may avoid future adverse decisions. The article then examines extra-
judicial forms of advocacy that groups and individuals may adopt 
in order to secure and develop marginalized groups members’ 
liberties. This project entails challenging the current legal rights 
framework’s underlying ideas of American identity, which 
privileges national sovereignty and citizenship. The article proposes 
a more inclusive framework that imposes duties on the state to non-
citizens through connections of family and on the basis of universal 
values. 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Supervising Attorney, Milton A. 
Kramer Law Clinic Center, Civil Rights and Human Rights Clinic. My thanks to Siegel College and 
Cleveland City Club participants for their comments and questions at my presentations on The Muslim-Ban 
Case. My additional thanks to my colleagues, Tim Duff, Sharona Hoffman, and Andrew Pollis, for their 
helpful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Doron Kalir for our long discussions that 
formed the basis of many of the ideas presented here. Finally, my deep appreciation to the excellent editors 
at the Journal of Race, Gender & Justice for their many improvements to the article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s Muslim-ban decision in Trump v. Hawaii1 raises an important question 
for civil-rights attorneys seeking protection for their clients from the U.S. government’s harmful 
national security policies: Should they stop litigating? Or more specifically, what strategies should 
civil-rights advocates employ to avoid the Supreme Court’s rulings that almost uniformly defer to, 
and thus validate, the government’s national-security practices?   
Civil rights attorneys have long sought refuge for their clients in court when government action 
threatens people’s constitutional rights. Advocates look to an independent judiciary to act as a 
check on the political branches, curbing majoritarian excesses. But in the national security realm—
particularly at the Supreme Court stage—good intentions and high expectations often lead to 
negative, long-term consequences for the very people and principles their advocates seek to 
protect. The proposed opposition to litigating is thus both specialized and opportunistic—very 
much “a sometime thing”2—aimed at protecting minority and immigrant rights in the national 
security context. 
                                                 
1 This article refers to Hawaii v. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) as The Muslim-Ban Case. In doing 
so, I underscore the article’s thesis, which is that, in litigating national security-civil rights cases 
in the courts—and the Supreme Court in particular—advocates succumb to an inhospitable legal 
rights framework that reiterates narratives, which heighten executive power and diminish 
marginalized and immigrant groups’ interests. These narratives adopt arguments, cases, and 
terminology that invariably validate government policies. Language matters. By denominating the 
case as The Muslim-Ban Case (not dissimilar to The Chinese Exclusion Case née Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889)), this article aims to resist validating the Hawaii v. Trump 
opinion in linguistic fashion. It is my hope that the article as a whole raises additional questions 
over whether and how advocates resist legally validating the ban and future harmful government 
policies.  
2 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1351 
(2006) (quoting CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
UNNAMED 109 (1997)) [hereinafter Waldron, Judicial Review]. 
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Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Supreme Court has issued opinions that generally 
endorse the government’s national security policies and practices, including, but not limited to, 
long-term detention, abusive security measures, and criminalizing the teaching of international 
humanitarian law.3 Rather than serve as a check on the President and his invocation of foreign 
affairs powers and execution of counterterrorism policies, the Court’s opinions—even the 
“wins”—often legitimate the President’s actions. Civil-rights advocates thus do not simply “lose” 
national security cases in the Supreme Court. By vindicating national security policies, the Court 
provides precedents for the political branches and the judiciary to follow and build on in the future. 
These opinions embolden aggressive counterterrorism actions, with potential spillover into 
domestic contexts far removed from national security and foreign affairs. The government and 
courts may thus seek to leverage The Muslim-Ban Case—an opinion about the President’s 
extensive authority to limit the entry of aliens4 to the country—to broaden presidential powers as 
                                                 
3 See infra Part I.A–E. See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Presumed Imminence: Judicial Risk 
Assessment in the Post-9/11 World, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2014) [hereinafter Cover, 
Presumed Imminence]. Judicial deference is not merely a post-9/11 casualty; upholding executive 
action in the security context has a long history. See id. at 1443–45. Justice Breyer contends that 
the Court has “moved from an attitude of deference to one of scrutiny” in national security cases. 
STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 80 (2016). Such scrutiny, however, may often serve to legitimate, rather than check, 
presidential power. See infra Part I.F. Moreover, the constancy of the national surveillance state 
and the prospect of a forever war elevate worries over the long-term effect on civil liberties. Cover, 
Presumed Imminence, supra at 1418–19; See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National 
Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11–20 (2008); BREYER, supra at 81 (suggesting that the 
Court has more readily accepted post-9/11 cases to review because of the indefinite nature of 
terrorist threats). 
4 As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in The Muslim-Ban Case, “many consider ‘using the 
term ‘alien’ to refer to other human beings’ to be ‘offensive and demeaning.’” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2444 (Sotomayor, J.., dissenting) (quoting Flores v. United States Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., 718 F.3d 548, 551–552 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013)). I therefore employ the term in the Article only 
to “‘to be consistent with the statutory language’ that Congress has chosen and ‘to avoid any 
confusion in replacing a legal term of art with a more appropriate term.’” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 
2444 (quoting Flores, 718 F.3d at 551–552 n.1). 
6.26.2019                       23 JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE __ (Forthcoming 2019)    Avidan Y. Cover 
 
5 
 
they relate to policies within the United States and weaken individuals’ antidiscrimination 
protections. 
The Trump presidency heightens concerns that judicial validation of belligerent national 
security polices is likely to increase in the coming years for at least three reasons. First, President 
Trump acts with less restraint than prior presidents, adopting policies that both aggressively curtail 
constitutional rights and rest on expansive Article II theories of a powerful Executive.5 The 
                                                 
5 However, presidents of both political parties commonly assert broad executive powers in the 
national security and immigration contexts, impinging on non-citizens and minorities’ rights. See, 
e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 
21–25, 40–41 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT] (contending Obama 
administration largely accepted Bush administration’s national security policies). The Trump 
administration’s arguments and policy at issue in The Muslim-Ban Case bear some similarity to 
preceding administrations. The Bush administration commonly asserted that the President enjoyed 
unreviewable powers in responding to terrorist attacks. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 
1299 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (observing that government’s 
theory permitted it to detain indefinitely, “and to do with . . . these detainees as it will, when it 
pleases, without any compliance with any rule of law of any kind, without permitting [a detainee] 
to consult counsel, and without acknowledging any judicial forum in which its actions may be 
challenged.”). The Bush administration also conducted a program that required alien males over 
the age of 16 from 24 Muslim-majority states and North Korea to register with the government 
and provide data enabling monitoring and immigration-law enforcement. See Rajah v. Mukasey, 
544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding National Security Entry–Exit Registration System 
(NSEERS) program). See also Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419, 2421 (citing Rajah in support of 
deference and history of government programs applying to non-immigrant aliens from Muslim-
majority countries); Kaveh Wadell, America Already Had a Muslim Registry, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 
20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/12/america-already-had-a-
muslim-registry/511214/ (noting similarities between President-elect Trump’s proposed targeting 
of Muslims with, and possible expansion of, NSEERS). The Obama administration argued—in 
strikingly similar fashion to the Trump administration’s arguments in The Muslim-Ban Case—that 
courts could not review a State Department consulate official’s denial of a visas to a citizen’s 
foreign spouse, even if there is “undeniable proof” of racist reasons for the denial. Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 12, Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (No. 13–1402), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2014/13-1402_k536.pdf. 
Of course, President Obama’s most relevant executive acts here were his Deferred Action for 
Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) and Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) programs. DAPA permitted illegal immigrants who were parents of 
citizens or lawful permanent residents to be lawfully present in United States. DACA authorized 
undocumented individuals who had entered the United States as Children to apply for deferral of 
removal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s injunction against the DAPA’s 
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Muslim-ban proclamation is a prime example.6 Second, President Trump’s two Supreme Court 
appointments—Brett Kavanaugh and Neil Gorsuch—will likely cement for a generation the 
Court’s deferential national security posture of negligibly limiting the Executive.7 Third, President 
Trump has overhauled much of the federal judiciary, naming numerous judges to the lower courts 
who are not likely to sympathize with civil-rights attorneys when it comes to the government’s 
stance on national-security.8 But civil-rights advocates cannot simply capitulate to  government 
policies that target and harm immigrants and minority groups.  
                                                 
implementation and DACA’s expansion, holding that the programs exceeded the President’s 
authority. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). An equally divided Supreme Court 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per 
curiam). This unfavorable judicial treatment of executive authority stands apart from most of the 
Court’s opinions on presidential power, raising questions whether the courts were motivated more 
by anti-immigrant and nativist impulses than concern over illegitimate exercise of power. On the 
other hand, civil rights advocates readily embraced claims of discretionary executive power, barely 
recognizable from the separation-of-powers arguments they marshaled in The Muslim-Ban Case 
and in others cases discussed in this article. 
6 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418-20 (discussing presidential authority to issue Muslim ban). 
7 See Helen Klein Murillo, Yishai Schwartz, & Clara Spera, Neil Gorsuch on National Security 
Law, LAWFARE, FEB. 1, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/neil-gorsuch-national-
security-law (inferring from then-Judge Gorsuch’s deferential decisions in the policing context 
that he would rule similarly in national security-related cases and noting his “Narrow, but 
Deferential, Immigration Rulings”); Jonathan Hafetz, Judge Kavanaugh’s record in national-
security cases, SCOTUSBLOG, 2018, (Aug. 29, 11:02 AM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaughs-record-in-national-security-cases/ 
(surveying then-Judge Kavanaugh’s national security opinions and describing his jurisprudence as 
has having “consistently articulated a broad view of executive power, a narrow conception of the 
judiciary’s role (at least absent express instruction by Congress), and skepticism toward the 
enforcement of individual rights under the Constitution”). 
8 See Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell preps new nuclear option to speed Trump 
judges, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/06/trump-mcconnell-judges-1205722  
(last updated Mar. 6, 2019, 07:45 AM) (describing Trump’s appointing of “roughly 20 percent of 
the Circuit Court seats in the country after just two years in office,” resulting in “few, if any, 
vacancies there for a potential Democratic president in 2021”); See Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is 
Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, (July 31, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/us/politics/trump-
judges.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=first-
column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news (noting that President Trump had more 
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Litigation may serve as a necessary corrective to executive overreach and curtailment of 
marginalized groups’ civil liberties. Filing lawsuits at the early stages of the Muslim-ban rollout 
enabled thousands of people to enter the United States and forestall their forcible return to other 
nations.9 Civil rights groups have seen their prominence rise, largely due to their ramped up 
litigation efforts against Trump.10 But in litigating, these organizations may want to consider 
approaches that avoid constitutional issues in favor of statutory claims. In fashioning such claims 
litigants may avoid precedents with wider constitutional repercussions and confine holdings to 
respective legislation. They also may want to prioritize individual clients over impact litigation 
and policy challenges, seek out settlements, and forego appealing to the Supreme Court should 
they lose in lower courts.  Ultimately, however, civil-rights advocates should not limit their appeals 
to the courtroom. 
Civil-rights advocates must not abandon litigation as an advocacy tool, but they should explore 
other means, concentrating, for example, on electoral efforts at both the congressional and 
                                                 
circuit court nominees confirmed “than any other president had secured at this point in his 
presidency since the creation of the regional circuit court system in 1891”). 
9 See, e.g., Maeve Higgins, God Bless America, and Her Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 26, 2019),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/26/opinion/sunday/immigration-lawyers-travel-ban.html. 
10 Anthony D. Romero, Here Is the ACLU’s 7-Point Plan of Action to Take on the Trump 
Administration, ACLU (Jan 19, 2017, 9:15 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/here-aclus-7-point-
plan-action-take-trump-administration (“We will be the David to the federal government’s 
Goliath.  The ACLU has 300 litigators, spread out among our national headquarters and each of 
the 50 states.”); Liam Stack, Donations to A.C.L.U. and Other Organizations Surge After Trump’s 
Order, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan 30, 2017) (describing Immigration Law Center’s increase in number and 
size of donations); Joel Lovell, Can the A.C.L.U. Become the N.R.A. for the Left?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, (July 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/magazine/inside-the-aclus-war-
on-trump.html (quoting ACLU Executive Director Anthony Romero on how litigation and public 
advocacy caused the Trump administration to back down on its family separation policy); id. 
(noting that in 15 months after the election, ACLU memberships more than quadrupled from 
400,000 to 1.84 million and annual donations increased from between $3 and $5 million to $120 
million).  
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presidential levels.11 Congress, as a political branch, may be better positioned to act as a check on 
the President.  Indeed, in one of its less equivocal rejections of post-9/11 national security policies, 
the Court struck down the Defense Department’s military commissions largely on the grounds that 
it violated congressionally-passed Uniform Code of Military Justice provisions.12 On the other 
hand, Congress (especially a veto-proof majority) has rarely sought to restrain the President in his 
execution of national security related powers, deferring in a fashion similar to the judiciary.13 The 
indefinite and expanding nature of national security threats and the concomitant concentration and 
expansion of power in the executive branch demands civil rights advocates’ increased attention to 
the electoral process. 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Faiz Shakir, How the ACLU Plans to Engage in the 2018 Midterm Elections, ACLU, 
(Jan. 11, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/mobilization/how-aclu-plans-engage-2018-
midterm-elections (describing how the “ACLU plans to do electoral work in a serious way for the 
first time” but remain non-partisan); Shadi Hamid, The Travel Ban, the Law, and What’s ‘Right’, 
THE ATLANTIC, (June 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/06/trump-travel-
ban-supreme-court/564044/ (characterizing Muslim-Can Case as “correct,” though perhaps not 
“right,” and proposing that instead of litigating “[m]oral judgments on constitutionally and legally 
muddy debates . . . they’re best rendered by persuading as many of our fellow citizens that they 
should stop voting for anti-Muslim presidents”). 
12 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Some scholars have questioned whether the 
decision actually hinged on a congressional limitation, viewing the military commissions as a 
constitutionally suspect executive action taken in the absence of congressional action. See David 
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb, Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 709 (2008). 
13 A new Democratically controlled House of Representatives may embrace legislation limiting 
the Executive’s military-related powers, but whether a full Congress will ultimately enact such 
laws is doubtful. See Bryan Bender & Gregory Hellman, Democrats vow new scrub of post-9/11 
war powers, POLITICO, (Dec. 24, 2018, 07:14 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/24/democrats-911-war-powers-military-1074808 
(addressing congressional interest in revising the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, 
which three presidents have relied in executing military action well beyond responding to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks). Congress did vote to terminate the President’s recent emergency declaration 
intended to obtain border-wall funding, but the President vetoed the legislation. Ben Jacobs, Trump 
overrules Congress with veto to protect border emergency declaration, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 15, 
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/15/trump-veto-national-emergency-
declaration-resolution-senate.  
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Advocacy groups should also continue to concentrate on local and group-minded expressions 
of dissent. The embrace of refugees and protests against the Muslim ban—often spearheaded by 
community and religious groups—offer a vision of American society distinct from the Court’s 
highly statist and executive-led structure, which more often than not discounts the rights of non-
citizens. These extra-legal sources provide a more inclusive basis for a national identity, which 
may eclipse an entrenched-rights framework that disfavors marginalized groups, particularly 
immigrant populations in national security contexts.  
This article contends that The Muslim-Ban Case confirms the judiciary’s endorsement of the 
executive branch’s increasing aggrandizement of power in the national-security and immigration 
context, resulting in violations of non-citizens’ freedoms and interests. In seeking to vindicate non-
citizens’ rights in court, litigants instead may invite the Supreme Court’s validation of executive-
branch policies. Rather than run to court, this article argues that advocates should explore varied 
approaches outside litigation that channel a broader understanding of national identity that might 
embrace foreign family members and refugees. Part I addresses the case against litigation, by 
examining how The Muslim-Ban Case is no aberration, but is instead the product of a national 
security jurisprudence upholding executive branch polices, and a harbinger of future judicially 
validated civil-rights violations. The section addresses several problematic aspects shared by The 
Muslim-Ban Case and other national security cases, which illustrate the danger of the Supreme 
Court’s review. Part II considers legal scholarship cautioning against advocacy that relies heavily 
on litigation. The section also discusses how legal-advocacy groups in Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories either abandoned litigation or considered doing so after they found that the 
Israeli High Court of Justice legitimated the government’s occupation policies and practices. Part 
III addresses the case for litigation in the face of these specific and general concerns. Finally, Part 
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IV proposes several strategies civil-rights advocates and attorneys should consider when weighing 
and waging litigation in the national security context. Part IV concludes with a series of extra-
judicial advocacy proposals, which includes an alternative framework to the confining legal-rights 
model that litigants invariably adopt in court. 
I. THE SPECIFIC CASE AGAINST LITIGATION 
The Muslim-Ban Case illustrates the lengths to which the Court defers to the President in the 
national security context. After purporting to consider President Trump and his advisers’ numerous 
anti-Muslim statements in connection with the Muslim ban, the Court upheld Proclamation No. 
964514 because, on its face, the ban supported legitimate national security interests.15 The Court 
acknowledged the record evidencing the President’s animus toward Muslims, but ultimately found 
that, independent of its history, the Proclamation was a neutral and rational means to further 
security interests and therefore the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on their Establishment 
Clause claim.16 The Court’s inclination to divorce presidential policy from its starkly 
discriminatory motivations and intent lays bare the illusory limitations that constrain the President. 
At the very least, individual rights—particularly those of the most marginalized and unpopular—
hold little consequence to the Court when the President invokes national security.17  
                                                 
14 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
15 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420–23.   
16 See id. at 2423 (“[T]he Government has set forth a sufficient national security justification to 
survive rational basis review. We express no view on the soundness of the policy. We simply hold 
today that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
constitutional claim.”). 
17 In contrast, only weeks prior to The Muslim-Ban Case opinion, the Court held that state 
government officials’ statements reflected unacceptable anti-religious animus against a Christian 
baker who refused to customize a wedding cake for a same-sex couple. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (“The official expressions 
of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—comments that were not 
disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to the 
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Although the case is unique in that no prior Executive had so transparently and amply provided 
id-fueled, tweet-filled insights into a policy’s discriminatory purposes, the opinion’s reasoning 
inexorably follows from the Court’s earlier pronouncements on national security policies. Thus, 
The Muslim-Ban Case, is not an anomaly; rather it is a warning of what is to come. Thus, the 
opinion presents a useful case study for examining the problematic features of the Court’s national 
security jurisprudence that may militate against future civil rights litigation. The following 
discusses these common features. 
A. Deference 
The Court echoed its prior opinions’ holdings that courts should exercise deference in weighing 
the President’s national security and immigration decisions, explaining that “our inquiry into 
matters of entry and national security is highly constrained.”18 Courts have frequently justified 
their supine review on any number of considerations, including the action or precipitating event’s 
temporary or emergent nature; the international or foreign affairs dimension; and the issue’s 
complexity, imprecision, or secrecy.19 
The Court relied, for example, on Abbasi v. Ziglar, which held that executive officials enjoy 
immunity from lawsuits brought by non-citizens abused while in detention immediately following 
the September 11 terrorist attacks.20 The Court rejected the former detainees’ lawsuit because, it 
                                                 
affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires”). See 
infra Part IV.C.5 (discussing inconsistencies between Masterpiece and The Muslim-Ban Case). 
18 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420; See also id. at 2419 (“Mandel’s narrow standard of review ‘has 
particular force’ in admission and immigration cases that overlap with ‘the area of national 
security.’” (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972))).  
19 See Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1453–55 (discussing cases). 
20 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017)). 
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held in part, judicial review of the executive branch’s national security decisions intrudes on 
constitutional separation of powers.21   
Similarly, the Court relied on Humanitarian Law Project v. Holder, which held that teaching 
international law to members of a terrorist organization constitutes material support of terrorism.22 
There the Court deferred to government assertions about threats posed by such teaching due to the 
judiciary’s “lack of competence” in “collecting evidence and drawing inferences” regarding 
“questions of national security”.23   
These precedents and their citation foretold The Muslim-Ban Case’s predictable outcome and 
reflect the jurisprudence at the nexus of national security and non-citizens. The Court’s deferential 
default produces inevitably limited inquiries and standards of review favorable to the government, 
maximizing presidential authority and minimizing injury to minority groups’ legal interests. And 
the reasoning itself only reinforces and calcifies the deferential posture for future national security 
cases.  
B. Heightened Executive Power 
The Court frequently premises its deferential analysis on the relative skill and expertise of the 
political branches.24 In The Muslim-Ban Case, the Court elevated the abstract power of the 
                                                 
21 Id.  
22 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).  
23 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 34 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The Court also relied on precedents of deference that predate the post-
9/11 era. See, e.g., id. at 2421 (“But we cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s 
predictive judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve large 
elements of prophecy.’” (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 
U.S. 103, 111 (1948))). 
24 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (noting that “neither the Members of this 
Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and serious 
threats to our Nation and its people.”); Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 35 (describing 
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presidency over the particular actions of President Trump. In so doing it made the case for a 
stronger presidency and downplayed the President’s precise conduct. While purporting to give 
equal weight to the general and specific—“we must consider not only the statements of a particular 
President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself”25—the Court ultimately paid little heed 
to President Trump’s remarks. The opinion thus retains an air of unreality, trafficking in the 
theoretical over the concrete and circumscribing any problematic evidence through the forgiving 
lens applied to presidential actions.26 
The Court’s paean to executive power also reads gratuitously, divorced from its earlier analysis 
in the opinion where it held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), Congress authorized the President to 
issue the proclamation.27 It may be implicit that the Court considered the President to act at his 
height of powers under the Youngstown analysis because of the congressional grant.28 But the 
focus on presidential authority in the abstract when addressing the Establishment Clause claim, 
without reference to Congress, comes dangerously close to endorsing Justice Thomas’s view that 
                                                 
political branches as “uniquely positioned” to assess how particular activities relate to and impact 
terrorism and foreign policy). 
25 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.  
26 Id. (“But the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the 
significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, 
addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”). 
27 Id. at 2408. 
28 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
Justice Jackson’s three situations and “legal consequences” is the dominant model courts utilize in 
assessing presidential power in foreign affairs. Id. In the first category, the President’s “authority 
is at its maximum” when he “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” 
requiring the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” Id. at 635–37. The second category is “a 
zone of twilight” where the President and Congress may or may not enjoy “concurrent authority.” 
Id. at 637. Here, the President acts on his “independent” authority, without “either a congressional 
grant or denial of authority.” Id. Finally, the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb” when he acts 
in a way “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,” demanding that such 
measures “be scrutinized with caution.” Id. at 637–38. 
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“the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.”29 Elevating presidential 
authority on such ambiguous bases, separate from constitutionally express or implied grants, 
“invite[s] political abuse and endanger individual liberties.”30 Clarity on the President’s source of 
power is therefore vital. 
C. Diminished Harm 
In addition to elevating executive authority, the Court’s deference entails minimizing the harm 
suffered by litigants. Absent from The Muslim-Ban Case is any discussion of the policy’s impact 
(or its motivations) on the plaintiffs and any others similarly situated. In not so subtle fashion, the 
Court pushes to the side the victims—American Muslims and their family members. 
First, the Court’s review of the record is cursory at best. Though the Court acknowledged that 
“[a]t the heart of plaintiffs’ case is a series of statements by the President and his advisers casting 
doubt on the official objective of the Proclamation,”31 the Court devoted only three brief 
paragraphs to the statements.32 In contrast to the majority’s “highly abridged account,”33 Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent documents the statements in 13 paragraphs bringing to the fore front  the 
Proclamation’s background of anti-Muslim animus.34 
These statements are not inscrutable, but egregious, in their focus on, and malice toward, 
Muslims: 
                                                 
29 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
30 Louis Fisher, The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 569, 
589 (2010).   
31 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
34 See id. at 2435–38. 
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 As part of his presidential campaign, then candidate Trump issued a press 
release, stating: “Donald J. Trump is calling for a total and complete shutdown 
of Muslims entering the United States.”35 
 
 Candidate Trump said, “I think Islam hates us. . . we can’t allow people coming 
into this country who have this hatred of the United States. . . . And of people 
that are not Muslim.”36 
 
 Responding to the suggestion that he might be rolling back the Muslim ban 
idea, candidate Trump stated, “I’m looking now at territories. People were so 
upset when I used the word Muslim. Oh, you can’t use the word Muslim.  
Remember this. And I’m okay with that, because I’m talking territory instead 
of Muslim.”37 
 
 After President Trump signed the first Executive Order iteration of the ban, his 
legal adviser Rudy Giuliani explained, “[W]hen [Mr. Trump] first announced 
it, he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a commission together.   
Show me the right way to do it legally.’”38 
 
 In response to the Supreme Court’s partial injunction of the second Executive 
Order implementing the ban, President Trump described the order as a “watered 
down version of the first one . . . tailor[ed] [by] . . . the lawyers,” adding, “I 
think we ought to go back to the first one and go all the way, which is what I 
wanted to do in the first place.”39 
 
                                                 
35 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 54, Hawaii v. 
Trump, 258 F. Supp.3d 1188 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv00050-DKW-KSC) [hereinafter, 
[Proposed] Third Amended Complaint], https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-
lovells/pdf/hawaii/2017_10_10_367_1_proposed_third_amended_complaint_and_inj.pdf  
(quoting Press Release, Donald J. Trump for President, Donald J. Trump Statement on Preventing 
Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015)).  
36 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 57 (quoting Anderson Cooper 360 
Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump (CNN television broadcast Mar. 9, 2016, 8:00 
PM EST), transcript available at https://goo.gl/y7s2kQ). 
37 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 62 (quoting Meet the Press with 
Chuck Todd (NBC television broadcast July 24, 2016), transcript available at 
https://goo.gl/jHc6aU). 
38 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 70 (quoting Amy B. Wang, Trump 
asked for a ‘Muslim ban,’ Giuliani says – and ordered a commission to do it ‘legally’, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://goo.gl/Xog80h). 
39 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 84 (quoting Katie Reilly, Read 
President Trump’s Response to the Travel Ban Ruling: It ‘Makes Us Look Weak’, TIME (Mar. 16, 
2017), https://goo.gl/UcPHfg). 
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 Among his many statements on Twitter supporting the Muslim ban, President 
Trump tweeted: “The travel ban into the United States should be far larger, 
tougher and more specific[] but stupidly, that would not be politically 
correct!”40 
 
Despite the teeming public record, the Court did not actually consider the impact of these 
statements. The majority opinion explained it “may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence,”41 but 
that “we must consider not only the statements of a particular President,”42 and that “the only 
question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid 
Proclamation.”43 But it rejected the plaintiffs’ formulation of the harm—that “this President’s 
words strike at fundamental standards of respect and tolerance, in violation of our constitutional 
tradition.”44 Instead, the Court limited its inquiry to “the significance of those statements in 
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of 
executive responsibility.”45  
The Court’s contextualization explains in part a standard of review that necessarily ignores the 
fact and import of the President’s statements. The Court’s holding that the plaintiffs had standing 
because of their separation from family, rather than from any dignitary and spiritual harm, might 
seemingly justify looking away from the anti-Muslim statements and focusing instead on the 
abstracted question of the denial of entry to foreign nationals.46 Though the Court’s remarks on 
                                                 
40 [Proposed] Third Amended Complaint, supra note 35, at ¶ 87 (quoting Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 15, 2017, 6:54 AM EDT), https://goo.gl/CGtXnD). 
41 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
42 Id. at 2418. 
43 Id. at 2423. 
44 Id. at 2418. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 2416. 
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executive power read anodyne, the larger legal meaning is severe and substantive: American 
Muslims’ Establishment Clause claims, even when alleging injuries of family disruption and 
religious humiliation, are weak and of little import, even where religious animus motivates 
government policy. 
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,47 the Court similarly disregarded the plaintiffs’ allegations that federal 
government officials issued discriminatory policies resulting in the arrest and detention of 
thousands of Arab Muslim men after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In holding that the 
plaintiff’s allegations were implausible because they were “conclusory,” the majority 
characterized specific paragraphs as “bare assertions” without considering the complaint as a 
whole and numerous other paragraphs supporting the discrimination claims.48 The Court’s reading 
is particularly questionable given that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court should have 
“assum[ed] that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”49 Thus, the 
Court often justifies its deference to the Executive on an inverse relationship between high 
presidential acumen and minimal impact on the targeted population. The Court appears 
predisposed to ignore or explain away the harms that outgroups suffer, creating a “willful 
blindness” within the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
47 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
48 Id. at 681; The dissent saw the majority’s interpretation of the complaint’s facts as highly 
selective. See id. at 697–99 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The fallacy of the majority’s position, 
however, lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation. . . Taking the complaint as a whole, 
it gives Ashcroft and Mueller “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 
rests.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
49 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 696 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
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These “willful-blindness” features are present in the very case the Court insisted has no 
connection with the Muslim ban and claimed to have overruled.50 In addressing Japanese-
American citizen Fred Korematsu’s conviction for violating the World War II-era military’s 
exclusion order (which required the removal and detention of all citizens of Japanese ancestry), 
the Court also denied that the case was about animus. “To cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses 
the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his 
race.”51 There too the Court denied any racist element and then elevated the security interests: war, 
military necessity, exigency, and political branch determinations.52 Just as The Muslim-Ban Case 
Court cast aside or minimized evidence of Trump’s anti-Muslim motivations, so too did the 
Korematsu Court dilute or deny the consideration of race in the internment of Japanese Americans.  
The Muslim-Ban Case is another example of how even when such animus is present, it does not 
offend the Constitution. 
D. Weakening Standards 
The Court altered several judicial standards of review in sustaining the Muslim ban. The 
Court’s subverting of standards of review reflects a pattern in national security cases in which the 
Court crafts an outcome-determinative standard of review that will not disturb the Executive’s 
                                                 
50 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423 (“Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible 
relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is 
objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken 
that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the 
privilege of admission.”). 
51 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944), abrogated by Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392. 
52 See id. at 223–24. 
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policy. Of equal concern is whether the reduced standards of review may expand beyond the 
already ambiguously defined national security context to other areas of law.53 
The Court explicitly stated that it would not treat the plaintiffs’ claim that the ban was 
motivated by religious animus as a “conventional Establishment Clause claim.”54 The Court 
explained that the “national security and foreign affairs context”55 affected the “scope of the 
constitutional right” and “standard of review,”56 leading it to reject the Establishment Clause’s “de 
novo ‘reasonable observer’ inquiry.”57 In so doing, the Court minimized the constitutional right 
asserted and departed entirely from established First Amendment case law. The Court’s “national 
security and foreign affairs” language suggests a limiting principle that might preclude applying 
the diluted standard to run-of-the-mill Establishment Clause cases.58 But the plaintiffs were not 
those seeking entry to the United States; they were American citizens within the confines of the 
country.   
The Court then claimed that the foreign-affairs-national security-entry context should require 
it to apply “a more constrained standard of review,”59 that requires “asking only whether the policy 
is facially legitimate and bona fide.”60 However, apparently because the government conceded at 
oral argument that reviewing the President’s disparaging comments was proper, the Court 
                                                 
53 See Maryam Jamshidi, The Travel Ban: Part of a Broad National Security Exceptionalism in 
U.S. Law, JUST SECURITY, (July 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58794/travel-ban-part-
broad-national-security-exceptionalism-u-s-law/  
54 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418.   
55 Id. at 2420 n.5. 
56 Id. at 2418. 
57 Id. at 2420 n.5. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 2420. 
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acknowledged that it could “look behind the face of the Proclamation.”61 Tellingly, the Court did 
not adopt Justice Kennedy’s 2015 controlling concurrence in Kerry v. Din, which held that courts 
should “look behind” the proffered reasons of a Department of State consulate official’s denial of 
a visa when there is “an affirmative showing of bad faith.”62 Kennedy’s  level of review would 
have seemed warranted given the alleged liberty interests implicating the family relationship.63 
Instead, the Court deviated from even the “circumscribed review” precedent, holding that its 
“look behind” would entail only “rational basis review.”64 It is possible to read the Court’s analysis 
as sui generis—a product of the government’s unique concession to reviewing past presidential 
statements. But at the very least, the Court appeared to reject—at least by omission—Justice 
Kennedy’s “look behind” analysis, also avoiding any determination that the extrinsic evidence 
rises to an “affirmative showing of bad faith.”65 The Court never once addressed its failure to 
utilize Kennedy’s analysis that is vital where plaintiffs credibly allege ill motive. 
Finally, the Court also manipulated the traditional rational-basis review it purported to apply. 
The Court explained that it “will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to 
result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.”66 The Court did not, however, 
                                                 
61 Id.  
62 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
63 See infra Part IV.C.5. 
64 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
65 See id. at 2441 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Finally, even assuming that Mandel and Din 
apply here, they would not preclude us from looking behind the face of the Proclamation because 
plaintiffs have made ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith,’ by the President who, among other 
things, instructed his subordinates to find a ‘lega[l]’ way to enact a Muslim ban.”) (quoting Din, 
135 S. Ct., at 2141) (citations omitted). 
66 Id. at 2420. The Court also appeared to depart from its long-held view that “[t]he Constitution’s 
guarantee of equality ‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.” United States v. 
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address the policy’s potentially discriminatory purposes; it was a one-sided analysis that only 
considered the government’s arguments, inevitably permitting pretexts for discriminatory policies 
as legitimate interests.67 Indeed, although the Court indicated it would review the statements, the 
Court’s “highly abridged account”68 of the statements lacked any substantive discussion.      
The Court also departed from the analytical approach it had utilized in prior cases alleging 
discriminatory motivation.  In these cases, the Court considered both the government interests 
supporting the policy and the challengers’ assertions of animus. For example, in Romer v. Evans,69 
the Court did not simply accept Colorado’s claims that the landlords’ freedom of association, 
discomfort with homosexuality, and preserving government resources to fight discrimination 
against other groups justified the state constitutional amendment’s prohibition on ordinances 
protecting the gay community from discrimination.70 Instead, the Court also considered and 
weighed against these interests whether Amendment 2 was overbroad and motivated by animosity 
toward the gay and lesbian community.71   
The Muslim-Ban Case, despite its brief citation to a few of President Trump’s anti-Islamic 
statements, never analyzed the statements as reflecting possible animus. Though the Court 
                                                 
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–535 
(1973)). 
67 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420-23. 
68 Id. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
69 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
70 Id. at 635. 
71 Id. at 631–34; See also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–541 
(1993) (addressing how plaintiffs may prove Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and 
Equal Protection Clause violations with evidence of discriminatory purpose through “the historical 
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment 
or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history”). 
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suggested that it would consider “extrinsic evidence”72 “look behind”73 and “probe the sincerity 
of the stated justifications for the policy,”74 the Court engaged in no such inquiry. The Court found 
that the government’s reasons proffered for the Proclamation were sufficient. But a judicial review 
that discounts evidence—as was in ample supply here—of the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group”75 will inevitably accept any pretext and sanction the policy. 
E. Precedent and Contagion 
The Muslim-Ban Case’s ambiguity as to what triggers its circumscribed inquiry raises concerns 
about the clarity and scope of its applicability. The opinion describes a wide arena in which the 
Executive may act with primacy and little restraint. The majority alternatively describes the 
context in which the Muslim ban operates as “national security,”76 “entry,”77 “admission,”78 
“immigration,”79 “international affairs,”80 or “foreign affairs.”81 In some instances, these contexts 
overlap. These multiple triggers for increasing deference raise concerns over when the Court will 
modulate executive action.  
Whether The Muslim-Ban Case will ultimately weaken Establishment Clause, Equal 
Protection Clause, or immigration standards of review in different contexts remains to be seen. 
                                                 
72 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 2418. 
75 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
76 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2409, 2419–20, 2422. 
77 Id. at 2419–20. 
78 Id. at 2419. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 2409. 
81 Id. at 2419, 2422; id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (characterizing case as one entailing “the 
conduct of foreign affairs.”). 
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But the Court’s decisions in other national-security related cases have had far-reaching 
consequences, impacting case law in as routine areas as standing, pleading standards, and 
government immunity.  
In Iqbal, the Court articulated a parsimonious pleading standard for what constituted 
“plausible” claims. 82 The post-9/11 detention context and allegations against the attorney general 
and FBI director likely influenced the new test.83 The Court appeared sympathetic to the unique 
situation and the federal defendants’ actions, rendering it less inclined to find plausible a 
discriminatory motive in the detention rather than a common sense decision.84 The terrorist-attacks 
context also may have led the Court to heavily weigh the interference litigation might pose.85 It 
may also explain the Court’s gratuitous rejection of supervisory liability, an issue that the 
government appeared to have conceded.86 As a consequence of the opinion, plaintiffs in contexts 
far removed from national security matters now face greater hurdles at the pleading stage. To be 
sure, the Court’s limitations on pleading standards is not only a byproduct of national-security 
litigation. But this context may have played a precipitating or aggravating role.  
And in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,87 the Court appeared to tighten its Article III standing 
requirements, holding that plaintiffs’ fear of the government’s interception of their 
                                                 
82 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, at 678. 
83 See id. at 670 (noting Second Circuit Judge Jose Cabranes’s “concern at the prospect of 
subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to assert the defense of qualified 
immunity and charged with responding to ‘a national and international security emergency 
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic’—to the burdens of discovery on the basis 
of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s”) (citation omitted). 
84 See id. at 679, 682. 
85 See id. at 670, 685–86. 
86 See id. at 683. 
87 568 U.S. 398 (2013). 
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communications under amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was too 
speculative, insisting “that threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending.’”88 The Court held the 
plaintiffs could not satisfy the requirement despite their showing that their conduct fell within the 
ambit of the challenged act’s interceptive scope, and the government’s past monitoring, motive, 
and capability to intercept such communications.89 The national security context undoubtedly 
influenced the Court, impelling it to explicitly note that “separation-of-powers principles” called 
for judicial reticence.90 But courts may not cabin Clapper to the foreign intelligence gathering 
context. It is possible  that the opinion will have a ”transubstantive” effect, requiring a heightened 
showing for  standing in a range of settings beyond national security and foreign affairs.91  
Similar transubstantive questions arise over the Bivens doctrine.92 In Abbasi, the Court 
clarified its already anemic and minimal implied damages remedy for federal actors’ constitutional 
violations, holding that a Bivens remedy did not extend to a post-9/11 detention policy.93 Though 
future litigants may attempt to distinguish Abbasi on its unique facts, the opinion serves as yet 
another precedent that may limit federal government liability beyond the national-security context. 
                                                 
88 Id. at 401. 
89 See id. at 408–10; See also id. at 427–31 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recounting reasons government 
was likely to intercept plaintiffs’ communications and noting that “certainty is not, and never has 
been, the touchstone of standing”) (emphasis in original). 
90 Id. at 408; See also id. at 409 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases in which the 
Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence 
gathering and foreign affairs.”). 
91 See Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Clapper Opinion Recap: Supreme Court Denies Standing to Challenge 
NSA Warrantless Wiretapping, LAWFARE, (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:17 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/clapper-opinion-recap-supreme-court-denies-standing-challenge-
nsa-warantless-wiretapping.  
92 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
93 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–63. 
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It is too early to determine The Muslim-Ban Case’s precedential breadth for executive 
discretion in the security-immigration sphere and its limiting principles. But lower courts have 
cited The Muslim-Ban Case with approval in deferring to executive actions in the military context94 
and denying equal protection claims brought by foreign nationals outside the United States who 
allege discrimination based on presidential statements.95 In contrast, other lower courts have 
restricted The Muslim-Ban Case to circumstances that implicate the rights of foreign nationals 
                                                 
94 See Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (relying on Hawaii 
as support for its deferring to the military’s decision to exclude transgender individuals from 
military service) (quoting Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421-22).  
95 In S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018), the district court held that Hawaii’s 
“circumscribed inquiry” applied to an equal protection challenge asserting discriminatory intent 
brought by parents legally within the United States whose children would be denied entry into the 
country because of the termination of the Central American Minors program.  Id. at 1095. The 
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument “that the court should infer from President Trump’s anti-
Latino statements that the government acted with discriminatory animus and thus violated their 
equal-protection rights” because they relied on “cases that do not involve the admission of foreign 
nationals into the United States”. Id. See also Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, 317 F. Supp. 3d 917, 
930-31 (W.D. Tex. 2018) (applying Hawaii’s deferential standard to Mexican citizens’ equal 
protection challenge to their detention and revocation of humanitarian parole by immigration 
officials). 
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seeking entry to the United States96 and national security or foreign policy concerns.97 Other courts 
have distinguished the ban as a policy the President established under a broad grant of power from 
                                                 
96 See Regents of the Univ. of California v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 520 (9th 
Cir. 2018) (holding Hawaii inapposite and does not preclude plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to 
the government’s rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program based in part 
on “the physical location of the plaintiffs within the geographic United States”); Saget v. Trump, 
No. 18-CV-1599 (WFK) (ST), 2019 WL 1568755, *60 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019) (holding 
“deferential standard employed in Trump v. Hawaii does not apply to [ ] constitutional challenges 
to Haiti’s [Temporary Protected Status] [TPS] termination” brought by Haitian nationals within 
the United States); New York v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 351 F. Supp. 3d 502, 666 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting Hawaii’s deferential standard for analyzing plaintiffs’ claim that 
adding citizenship question to census violates equal protection under the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause) (“It is one thing to uphold an Executive Branch decision that could ‘reasonably 
be understood to result from a justification independent of’ an unconstitutional purpose in a context 
where the President exercises nearly ‘plenary’ power.” (citation omitted)); CASA de Maryland, 
Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 322-23 (D. Md. 2018) (rejecting Hawaii’s deferential standard 
for analyzing Salvadoran nationals’ equal protection challenge to termination of El Salvador’s TPS 
designation); Serv. Women’s Action Network (SWAN) v. Mattis, 352 F. Supp. 3d 977, 988 (N.D. 
Cal. 2018) (rejecting Hawaii’s deferential standard as required for “reviewing military decisions” 
in analyzing women soldiers and marines’ equal protection challenges to restrictive assignment 
policies and segregated training); Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(rejecting Hawaii’s deferential standard for analyzing Haitian, Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and 
Sudanese nationals’ equal protection challenge to termination of their nations’ TPS designations); 
Centro Presente v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 411 (D. Mass. 
2018) (rejecting Hawaii’s deferential standard for analyzing Haitian, Honduran, and Salvadoran 
nationals’ equal protection and due process challenge to termination of their nations’ TPS 
designations); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. United States 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576 (D. Md. 2019) (rejecting Hawaii’s deferential 
standard for analyzing Haitian nationals’ equal protection challenge to termination of Haiti’s TPS 
designation).  See also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 
2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2408) (rejecting government’s contention 
that “President’s authority to suspend aliens from entering the country, and to do so by 
proclamation” permitted President to deny eligibility for asylum to those who illegally entered the 
country by not presenting themselves at a port of entry because “the rule of decision imposes the 
penalty on aliens already present within our borders). See also Alison Frankel, Judges to DOJ: 
Don’t Overread Supreme Court’s Ruling in Trump v. Hawaii, REUTERS, (July 27, 2018, 1:47 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-hawaii/judges-to-doj-dont-overread-supreme-
courts-ruling-in-trump-v-hawaii-idUSKBN1KH2DT.   
97 See Regents, 908 F.3d at 520 (“[O]ur case differs from Hawaii in several potentially important 
respects, including . . . the lack of a national security justification for the challenged government 
action.”); Saget, 2019 WL 1568755, at *60; New York, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 666-67 (“Nothing in 
the opinion indicates that this ‘circumscribed inquiry’ applies outside of the ‘national security and 
foreign affairs context,’” and which, if applied more broadly, “would decimate [Equal Protection] 
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Congress.98 Courts have also emphasized the ban’s facial neutrality as to protected groups.99  Some 
courts have also stressed the “worldwide, multi-agency review” that the government purported to 
rely on in issuing the Proclamation to distinguish other restrictive policies from falling under The 
Muslim-Ban Case precedent.100  
Courts have also struggled over the degree to which The Muslim-Ban Case permits courts to 
consider extrinsic evidence under its deferential standard of review.  Some lower courts have 
stressed that the Supreme Court’s “look behind” means that “[j]udicial review, though more 
deferential than traditional strict scrutiny, remains fact based.”101  But other courts have construed 
The Muslim-Ban Case to direct a court reviewing matters relating to national security and foreign 
affairs not to “‘substitute’ [its] own ‘predictive judgments,’ or its own ‘evaluation of the underlying 
facts,’ for those of the President.”102 Yet in the domestic context, lower courts have also cited The 
                                                 
jurisprudence altogether”); CASA, 355 F. Supp. 3d at 323; SWAN, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 988; Ramos, 
336 F. Supp. 3d at 1105; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411-12; NAACP, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 
576. 
98 Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1105-06; 
99 Saget, 2019 WL 1568755, at *60; Karnoski v. Trump, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 
2018) (denying government motion for protective order in challenge to military service ban on 
openly transgender people). 
100 See Karnoski v. Trump, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1160 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (holding that The 
Muslim-Ban Case does not preclude discovery in lawsuit over military’s transgender ban). 
101 Ramos, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1108.  See also Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-CV-01263, 2018 WL 
5023330, *8 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 16, 2018) (“The Trump v. Hawaii court’s analysis, however, was, 
if anything, notable for being particularly situationally-minded and fact-intensive.”). But the nature 
and scope of review is hardly clear. As one district court noted, the Court failed to “explain[ ] the 
precise contours of its inquiry.” Texas v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 708 (S.D. Tex. 2018).  
See also id. at 709 (“Hawaii only speaks to the circumstances under which a court may look behind 
the Executive’s discretionary exclusion of certain aliens to determine whether the decision was 
motivated by unconstitutional reasons.”). 
102 Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 917 F.3d 694, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Williams, J., concurring). Judge 
Williams explained that Hawaii’s deferential review—“uphold the policy so long as it can 
reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds”—
should apply to a ban on transgender individuals serving in the military.  Id. at 731 (quoting 
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Muslim-Ban Case as reflecting an “evolving First Amendment jurisprudence suggest[ing] that 
courts should consider the historical and social context underlying a challenged government action 
to determine whether the action was neutral or motivated by hostility toward religion.”103 
Some scholars have argued that The Muslim-Ban Case should not apply to any number of 
immigrants-rights cases, including the Trump administration’s policies concerning the detention 
of asylum-seeking families and detainee abortion access.104 These scholars contend the case’s 
reach should be limited to (1) its facts, which entailed “questions of motive and proof;” and (2) its 
                                                 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2420). Judge Williams reasoned that the lenient review should apply because 
inquiry into such national security issues “‘raises concerns for the separation of powers’ by 
intruding on the President’s constitutional responsibilities,’” id. at 732 (quoting Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2419 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1861 (2017))), and “‘when it comes to collecting 
evidence and drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the lack of competence on the 
part of the courts is marked.’”  Id. at 731-32 (quoting Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34 (2010))).  See also Doe 2, 755 F. App’x at 24-25 
(quoting Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421-22) (dissolving injunction against military’s transgender ban); 
Yafai v. Pompeo, No. 18-1205, 2019 WL 2280087, *5 (7th Cir. May 23, 2019) (addressing visa 
application denial and holding that, per Mandel and Din, “a reviewing court looks to the face of 
the order only”); id. (noting that “at the request of the government, the [Hawaii] Court assumed 
that it could look behind the face of the order given the circumstances of that case. . . . [and] 
carefully confined [that assumption] as one ‘for our purposes today’”). However, at least one 
district court held that, notwithstanding “significant similarities between the Court’s deference to 
Congress in military affairs and its deference to the President in immigration affairs. . . the 
[Hawaii] decision is tangential, at best, to” an equal protection challenge to male-only military 
draft registration requirement.  Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. Supp. 3d 568 
(S.D. Tex. 2019), motion for relief from judgment denied, No. CV H-16-3362, 2019 WL 1902693 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2019) (appeal pending).  The court therefore applied a heightened level of 
scrutiny.  Id. at 578 (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981)). 
103 New Hope Family Servs., Inc. v. Poole, No. 518CV1419MADTWD, 2019 WL 2138355, *9 
(N.D.N.Y. May 16, 2019); Moses v. Ruszkowski, 2019-NMSC-003, ¶ 34 (Supreme Court of New 
Mexico). 
104 See Adam Cox, Ryan Goodman, & Cristina Rodriguez, The Radical Supreme Court Travel Ban 
Opinion–But Why It Might not Apply to Other Immigrants’ Rights Cases, JUST SECURITY (June 27, 
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/58510/radical-supreme-court-travel-ban-opinion-but-apply-
immigrants-rights-cases/.  
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subject, which concerned “‘immigration policies’ (or perhaps immigration policies implicating 
national security).”105   
Despite several lower courts’ disinclination to extend The Muslim-Ban Case, the Supreme 
Court will likely have the final say on the opinion’s legacy. In fact, the Trump administration has 
frequently circumvented the normal appeals process to obtain relief in the Supreme Court, 
attempting to wrest sympathetic interpretive control at an earlier stage.106 
Still, no matter what factual and contextual limitations future courts may apply to The Muslim-
Ban Case, they cannot fully cleanse its message. The case holds that the chief federal officer may 
repeatedly utter the foulest and most offensive statements about a particular minority group in 
support of a policy that disproportionately targets these group members, and available legal 
remedies will not concern themselves with that animus. 
F. Legitimacy 
Civil-rights advocates often seek judicial review in order to curb government violations of 
individual rights. In doing so, they may animate the checks and balances embedded in the 
                                                 
105 Id. Cox, Goodman, and Rodriguez further contend that the Muslim ban’s “doctrinal approach 
is irrelevant to other cases, even if those cases involve the rights of noncitizens.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
106 See Robert Barnes, Trump Officials Aggressively Bypass Appeals Process to Get Issues Before 
Conservative Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-officials-aggressively-bypass-
appeals-process-to-get-issues-before-conservative-supreme-court/2018/10/23/ce38b9da-d612-
11e8-83a2-d1c3da28d6b6_story.html?utm_term=.94c234cb78d4. The Trump administration has 
not always been successful. The Supreme Court rejected a government request to stay a district 
court order enjoining the administration’s policy of holding ineligible for asylum all immigrants 
who cross illegally into the United States from Mexico, while the government appeals to the Ninth 
Circuit. See Amy Howe, Justices Rebuff Government on Asylum Ban, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 21, 
2018, 3:56 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/justices-rebuff-government-on-asylum-
ban/.  
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constitutional structure. But as Charles Black observed, the Court’s interpretation is more likely to 
uphold the violation:   
[T]he prime and most necessary function of the Court has been that of validation, 
not that of invalidation. What a government of limited powers needs, at the 
beginning and forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all 
steps humanly possible to stay within its powers. That is the condition of its 
legitimacy, and its legitimacy, in the long run, is the condition of its life. And the 
Court, through its history, has acted as the legitimator of the government.107 
 
Whatever its moral failings and limitations as precedent, The Muslim-Ban Case vindicates 
President Trump’s policy judicially. The Court provided its legitimating stamp of approval, 
determining the ban is likely a constitutionally acceptable exercise of power.108 The Court also 
may have validated the ban by improving its most extreme features though a protracted legal 
process in the lower courts, which it oversaw both through its engagement and its silence.109 As a 
result of the government’s changes, the third version of the Muslim ban was still a ban, but 
different in form and asserted rationale, which enabled the Court to uphold its validity. Prior 
national security cases illustrate a comparable legitimacy-through-litigation process.  
Jack Goldsmith argues that the limits on presidential power imposed by “the GTMO habeas 
cases . . . also empowered the presidency and the military, directly and indirectly.”110 In 
Goldsmith’s account, civil-rights advocates’ legal challenges to executive detention at 
                                                 
107 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 52 
(1960.) 
108 See Hamid, supra note 11 (“[The Muslim-Ban Case] contributes to the legitimization and 
mainstreaming of anti-Muslim bigotry. That’s certainly how it will be interpreted by millions of 
Americans.”). 
109 Dara Lind, How Trump’s Travel Ban Became Normal, VOX, (June 26, 2018, 10:43 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/27/17284798/travel-ban-scotus-countries-protests. 
110 GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 5, at 194. 
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Guantanamo, led to the “ironic” and unintended consequences of securing indefinite detention in 
the rule of law.111 
Goldsmith explains that, “as a result of judicial and legislative interventions . . . there is no 
doubt now that the [executive counterterrorism] practices are lawful and legitimate within the 
American constitutional system.”112 The very fact of judicial and legislation consideration 
amounted more to “caveats,” which “empowered” rather than weakened the presidency.113 While 
allowing that “the courts and Congress imposed significant restraints on these traditional practices 
by the Commander in Chief,” Goldsmith argues that the Court’s limitations “also affirmed the 
legitimacy of the practices in the round” and “placed these practices on a much firmer foundation 
than they were during the early unilateralist era of George W. Bush.”114 Similarly, the Court’s 
rulings encouraged the political branches to improve counterterrorism policies such as detention 
review.115 But such “improvements” were largely procedural, leaving detainees indefinitely at 
Guantanamo. Thus, while the system of checks and balances “works,” it fails to fundamentally 
alter the Executive’s actions or substantively protect individuals’ civil rights.116 
                                                 
111 Id. at 196. 
112 Id. at 194. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 195. The successive Obama administration adopted many of these practices, further 
entrenching certain U.S. counterterrorism policies. See id. The Court’s sanctioning of many of 
these policies may have impelled Obama to continue these policies because they were now legally 
“approved.” Id. 
115 See id. at 231. Goldsmith further contends that while the Executive has amassed greater power 
after the 9/11 attacks, corresponding accountability and transparency mechanisms such as 
inspectors general, litigants, politics, and the press operate effectively, which “belies the many 
apocalyptic claims that we are living in an era of unrestrained presidential power.” Id. at 48, 252. 
116 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1013, 1016 (2008) (observing that “‘war on terror’ litigation in U.S. courts has been fixated on 
process to a degree that is peculiar and . . . there is something particular about American legal 
culture at this moment in time that provides at least part of th[e] explanation.”); id. at 1092 
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Others are not as sanguine as Goldsmith about the Court’s contributions, arguing that its 
opinions support only the modest proposition that where particular liberties are implicated some 
sort of process must be afforded.117 Though the Court famously intoned after the September 11 
terrorist attacks that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President,” the Court’s national 
security opinions often only establish some modicum of its own jurisdiction, but afford little 
protection for individual rights, particularly non-citizens’ rights.118   
Decisions based on Separation of Powers principles rather than the Bill of Rights similarly 
offer little protection for the targets and victims of national security policies.119 Thus, the Court’s 
invalidation of the military commissions in Hamdan, for example, amounted to much less a victory 
for detainee fair-trial rights, and more an insistence on legislative authorization of the tribunals.120  
Ongoing detention at Guantanamo, the D.C. Circuit’s resistance to releasing detainees, and 
resumption of military commissions under congressional authorization reveal the Guantanamo 
opinions’ limitations. The state of affairs reflects the hollowness and risk of litigated solutions.121   
                                                 
(“Unfortunately, the ‘war on terror’ litigation thus far seems to have resulted in a great deal of 
process, and not much justice.”). 
117 See Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 448–49 
(2010); See Martinez, supra note 116, at 1014-15. 
118 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004). Critically, the rest of the “blank-check” sentence 
reads: “. . . when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.” Id. (emphasis added). See also id. 
at 533 (holding “that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to 
rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.”).  
119 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 
127–30 (2011). 
120 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from 
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”); Martinez, supra note 116, at 
1030. 
121 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The New Judicial Deference, 92 B.U. L. REV. 89, 165 (2012) 
(“In the terrorism cases, the Supreme Court appeared to expand its powers, stand up to the political 
branches, and change the course of the anti-terror campaign by announcing that the President was 
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Regarding jurisdiction, The Muslim-Ban Case is similar to other “judicial victories” in that the 
Court rejected the government’s arguments based on the consular non-reviewability doctrine that 
the challenge to the travel ban was not justiciable.122 The Court resisted government contentions 
that because aliens had no right to enter the United States and that excluding aliens was “‘a 
fundamental act of sovereignty’” by a political branch, courts could only review exclusions where 
Congress so expressly authorized.123 But judicial review is not a vindication of the rights 
asserted.124 The Court “assume[d] without deciding” that it could review the plaintiffs’ statutory 
claims.125 In addition, the Court held that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
                                                 
constrained by law. . . . The Court’s public decisions disguised the small effects they actually had 
because the petitioners could not get much benefit from these rulings without more, much more.”). 
122 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2407. The Court noted that the government had not identified any 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act that expressly stripped the Court of jurisdiction 
over the statutory claims. See id. (citing Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center, 568 U.S. 
145, 153 (2013)). 
123  Id. at 2407 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542–543 
(1950)). 
124 See BLACK, supra note 107, at 52.  The ongoing litigation saga over jurisdiction and detainee 
rights at Guantanamo Bay evidences the less than inevitable relationship between justiciability and 
rights and remedies. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding courts have statutory 
jurisdiction to review Guantanamo Bay detainees’ habeas claims but failing to address potential 
constitutional violations).  It would take another four years before the Court held that the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied at Guantanamo, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 
(2008), and that the Detainee Treatment Act was” an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.” Id. 
at 792. But detainees languish at Guantanamo still. The Court has repeatedly denied detainees’ 
subsequent petitions for certiorari over the continuing congressional and constitutional bases for 
detention. See, e.g., al-Alwi v. Trump, No. 18-740, 2019 WL 2412913 (U.S. June 10, 2019) 
(statement of Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (“al-Alwi faces the real prospect that he 
will spend the rest of his life in detention based on his status as an enemy combatant a generation 
ago, even though today’s conflict may differ substantially from the one Congress anticipated when 
it passed the AUMF,” and prior armed conflicts that influenced international humanitarian law. 
(citing Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion)). 
125 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2407. As the Court observed, it had previously confronted similar 
arguments that courts could not review political branch decisions relating to the exclusion of aliens. 
Then and here, the Court did not directly address the judicial review argument but decided the 
merits of the statutory claim.  See id. (citing Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 
(1993)). In Sale, the Court ultimately held that statutory and treaty prohibitions on returning 
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challenge, finding they had standing based on the travel ban’s prohibition on their relatives’ 
entry.126   
The judicial process, including the Court’s direct involvement, pushed the government to 
amend, validate, and possibly sanitize the Muslim ban.127 The first iteration of the Muslim ban 
was hastily issued within one week of President Trump’s inauguration, and addressed foreign 
national entry in several extraordinary ways. The Executive Order (1) banned entry of seven 
majority-Muslim countries’ nationals, specifically from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, 
and Yemen; (2) applied to nationals who had already been issued visas; (3) applied to lawful 
permanent residents; (4) applied to dual nationals; (5) reduced the intake of refugees from 110,000 
to 55,000; (6) indefinitely suspended entry of all Syrian refugees; and (7) banned all other 
refugees’ entry for 120 days but provided an exception and possible case-by-case exception for 
religious minorities facing religious persecution (which appeared to select Christian minorities 
                                                 
refugees to countries where they face likely persecution did not apply in international waters, thus 
upholding an executive order directing the interdiction of Haitian boats and forced repatriation of 
passengers without determining their refugee status. 509 U.S. at 159. See also id. at 188 (noting 
that presumption that “Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial application unless 
such an intent is clearly manifested. . . . has special force when we are construing treaty and 
statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has 
unique responsibility.” (citing United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)). 
126 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. The Court found that “a person’s interest in being united with his 
relatives is sufficiently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact.” 
Id. The Court might have held that it lacked jurisdiction because the Establishment Clause did not 
afford the plaintiffs “a legally protected interest in the admission of particular foreign nationals.” 
Id. See also Marty Lederman, Contrary to Popular Belief, the Court Did Not Hold that the Travel 
Ban is Lawful—Anything But. (Which Makes Its Ruling, Justice Kennedy’s Deference, and the 
President’s Enforcement of the Ban Even More Indefensible.), n.2 (July 2, 2018), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/07/contrary-to-popular-belief-court-did.html. But the Court held 
that the question went to the merits rather than justiciability. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. See 
infra Part IV.C.5. 
127 See generally Lind, supra note 109. See also ACLU WASHINGTON, Timeline of the Muslim Ban, 
https://www.aclu-wa.org/pages/timeline-muslim-ban,  (providing a timeline of the Muslim ban 
and related litigation) 
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for special protections).128 The rollout of the order led to detentions of hundreds, chaos at 
airports, panic for thousands of foreign nationals and their family members, as well as public 
protests, multiple lawsuits, and the firing of the attorney general for refusing to defend the 
order.129   
The general uniformity of successful legal challenges130 prompted the government to issue a 
new order only six weeks later.131 In court, the government explained that the new order “clarifies 
                                                 
128 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017); See Exec. Order No. 13,780, “Protecting the 
Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017). 
129 See Litigation Documents & Resources Related to the Travel Ban, LAWFARE  (Dec. 23, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/litigation-documents-resources-related-travel-ban (providing 
documents from various cases litigating Muslim ban as of December 23, 2018); CENTER FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS & YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW CLINIC, WINDOW DRESSING THE 
MUSLIM BAN: REPORTS OF WAIVERS AND MASS DENIALS FROM YEMENI-AMERICAN FAMILIES 
STUCK IN LIMBO (June 2018), 
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/06/CCR_YLS_June2018_Report_Window-
Dressing-the-Muslim-Ban.pdf (documenting ongoing challenges that Yemeni-American families 
face due to ban); See CARDOZO LAW CLINICS ET AL., REPORT ON ABUSES IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ON IMMIGRATION, (Feb. 6, 2017), https://cardozo.yu.edu/news/cardozo-
report-abuses-aftermath-executive-order-immigration (documenting 26 accounts of alleged abuses 
and violations suffered by immigrant detainees at airports due to initial ban); Aaron Blake, 
Trump’s Travel Ban is Causing Chaos— and Putting His Unflinching Nationalism to the Test, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/01/29/president-trumps-travel-ban-is-causing-chaos-dont-expect-him-to-back-
down/?utm_term=.ecdd6c2f8beb; Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, THE NEW 
YORKER, (May 22, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-
stood-up-to-trump.  
130 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 
2017), appeal dismissed, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 3774041 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2017); Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May 31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), cert. 
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080, (2017), and vacated and remanded sub nom. Trump v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 
353 (2017). 
131 See Exec. Order No. 13,780. 
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and narrows the scope of Executive action regarding immigration, extinguishes the need for 
emergent consideration, and eliminates the potential constitutional concerns.”132 
The Second Executive Order fixed some of the prior order’s more egregious errors. The 
revised Muslim ban (1) removed Iraq (a close U.S. ally) from the banned countries; (2) clarified 
that the ban applied only to foreign nationals outside the United States who lacked a proper visa 
at the time of the first ban’s issuance; (3) exempted lawful permanent residents, dual nationals, 
and certain foreign nationals previously granted entry (including asylum); (4) provided for 
waivers on a case-by-case basis; and (5) removed from the refugee restrictions the “religious 
minority” exemption and the Syria-specific ban.133 Despite the changes, lower courts continued 
to enjoin the Muslim ban’s enforcement nationwide.134   
In June 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. In addition to granting the government’s 
petitions, the Court allowed portions of the ban to go into effect, though not as to persons with 
a “bona fide relationship” to family members or particular entities in the United States.135  
In September 2018, President issued a third version of the Muslim ban.136 The Proclamation 
removed Sudan from the list of banned countries but added Chad, North Korea, and some 
Venezuelan nationals to the banned list of majority-Muslim nations.137 After district courts granted 
preliminary injunctions, the Supreme Court granted stays pending both the government’s appeals 
                                                 
132 Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hawaii v. Trump, CV. NO. 17-00050 
DKW-KSC, (D. Hawaii Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/state-hawaii-and-
ishmael-elshikh-vs-donald-j-trump-et-al-order, (citing Notice of Filing of Executive Order 4–5, 
ECF No. 56. 
133 See Exec. Order No. 13,780. 
134 See, e.g., Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017). 
135 See IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. 
136 See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).  
137 See id. 
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to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and petitions for certiorari, allowing the third version of the ban 
to go into effect.138  
In addition to the substantive changes to the ban, the government offered more detailed security 
justifications for the restrictions with each iteration.139 The third ban, in particular, delineated how 
a “worldwide review” and multi-agency process led to the Proclamation’s identification of 
countries and limitations on entry.140 The Court thus issued its opinion on a very similar, yet 
differently positioned, policy, finding that the worldwide process provided “persuasive evidence 
that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns” and that the 
plaintiffs therefore would not likely succeed on the merits.141   
Judicial review thus acts as a legitimating force, even where it acts to restrain the President in 
relatively minimal ways. The constitutional validation is so much more pronounced when the 
Court upholds the Executive’s action. As Alexander Bickel explained, “[t]he Court’s prestige, the 
spell it casts as a symbol, enable it to entrench and solidify measures that may have been tentative 
in the conception or that are on the verge of abandonment in the execution.”142  
The Court’s treatment of the Muslim ban’s waiver provisions illustrates the perils of judicial 
vindication. The majority viewed favorably the Proclamation’s waiver program as a means to 
                                                 
138 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 (Mem.) (2017); Trump v. IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 542 (Mem.) (2017). 
139 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2403–06 (discussing rationale and purposes of Proclamation No. 
9645). 
140 Proclamation No. 9645, §1.  
141 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2421. 
142 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 129 (1962).  See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[O]nce a 
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather 
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for 
all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of 
transplanting American citizens.”). 
6.26.2019                       23 JOURNAL OF GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE __ (Forthcoming 2019)    Avidan Y. Cover 
 
38 
 
enable humanitarian exceptions and support legitimate security interests, seemingly granting a 
good-faith presumption to the President.143 Yet as Justice Breyer warned, and the majority 
dismissed as “but a piece of the picture,”144 the minimal waiver grants—the State Department 
reported approving two waivers out of 6,555 eligible applicants in the Proclamation’s first 
month145—suggested that the government was not applying the waiver program and “excluding 
Muslims who satisfy the Proclamation’s own terms.”146 Recent data indicate that the government 
denies 98 percent of waiver applications.147 The waiver program has demonstrably “not mitigated 
the ban’s effects on thousands of families in dire circumstances.”148 Yet the opinion entrenches 
these possibly tentative measures as lawful and legitimate. 
The hierarchical place that the Supreme Court holds in the legal system—and possibly 
society149—enables it to issue the “final” pronouncement on a contested matter, adding to the 
opinion’s legitimacy, if not infallibility.150 Its assertion of jurisdiction therefore offers the potential 
                                                 
143 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (discussing Proclamation No. 9645, § 3). 
144 Id. at 2423 n.7 (citation omitted). 
145 See id. at 2431 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. at 2430. The majority discounted Justice Breyer’s arguments as based on “selective 
statistics, anecdotal evidence, and a declaration from unrelated litigation” and inappropriate under 
rational review. Id. at 2423 n.7.  
147 Betsy Fisher & Samantha Power, The Trump Administration Is Making a Mockery of the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/27/opinion/trump-travel-ban-waiver.html. 
148 Id. 
149 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma,124 HARV. L. REV. ___ 
(2019) (forthcoming 2019) (invited book review essay), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3373969 at 11 (noting that although “the 
Court’s public approval rating has dropped, the overall level of confidence in the Court has 
nonetheless remained reasonably high, particularly as compared to Congress and the President”). 
150 See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”). 
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to check other branches but also to dominate interpretation of contested rights. What advocates 
must therefore ask is whether Supreme Court review so predictably results in validating 
presidential power and eroding marginalized-group rights such that they should forsake litigation, 
instead focusing on other means of, and forums for, advocacy that can protect these groups and 
reconstitute a definition of the state and peoples’ rights. As I explain in the next part, this question 
has arisen before. 
II. THE GENERAL CASE AGAINST LITIGATION 
Both prior and subsequent to the advent of the national surveillance state, scholars and civil-
rights advocates warned against litigation as a means to blunting executive powers that impair 
minority groups’ rights. Taking a normative approach, Jeremy Waldron questions locating disputes 
over rights within the Judicial Branch.151 He contends that such reliance “distracts [society] with 
side-issues about precedent, texts, and interpretation,” and “is politically illegitimate . . . 
privileging majority voting among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges.”152 
Moreover, the notion of courts as guardians of minority rights may rest on a faulty premise 
concerning judicial elites’ sympathies and beliefs.153 Waldron refutes that assumption, concluding 
that “[a] practice of judicial review cannot do anything for the rights of the minority if there is no 
support at all in the society for minority rights.”154  
                                                 
151 See Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1351. 
152 Id. at 1353. 
153 Id. at 1405. 
154 Id. at 1404. 
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Predating the 9/11 attacks, Mark Tushnet questioned liberals’ historical reliance on judicial 
review over political advocacy to protect individual rights.155 Tushnet faults a myopic litigation 
approach for both its hubris and underestimating of harm. First, “[l]awyers are likely to 
overestimate the contributions we can make to social progress, for obvious and understandable 
reasons. Cautions about what we can actually accomplish help deflate our sense that we are 
essential contributors to social change.”156 Second, “[w]hen people lose in the Supreme Court, 
they really lose, because the rest of society may come to think not merely that their claims lacked 
constitutional force, but that their claims had no moral justification whatever.”157 Tushnet’s 
observations enjoy equal, if not greater, force in the national security and immigration contexts. 
Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf maintain that the post-9/11 civil rights “interventionist” 
litigation strategy and narrative suffers from amnesia. In celebrating the judiciary in the face of a 
“legally deviant” executive, the legal argument minimizes the long American history of 
suppressing marginalized groups in the name of security.158 Even apparent legal victories may 
alarm certain quarters and generate backlash.159 Richard Fallon similarly suggests that the Court’s 
                                                 
155 See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 129 (1999). See 
also id. at 65 (“It would be a mistake to think that the public’s [constitutional rights] definitions 
have to be the same as the ones the Court offers . . .”). 
156 Id. at 141.  See also Jane H. Aiken & Stephen Wizner, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law 
School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1008 n.41 (2004) 
(warning that “lawyer-driven” and “organization-driven” impact and reform-minded litigation, as 
opposed to “client-driven” efforts, may be perceived as using the law “to empower lawyers to 
determine in the abstract what is in the public interest” rather than “to struggle for social justice 
for the poor”). 
157 TUSHNET, supra note 155, at 138. 
158 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 444–45. See id. at 470–71 (arguing that the 
interventionist position “failed because it was premised upon a legalistic view of rights that simply 
cannot be squared with the reality of the American political experience”). 
159 See id. at 462, 471. 
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“War on Terror” decisions are “politically constructed,” insofar as the Justices decide issues based 
on anticipated popular reception and respect of political branches.160   
Noting the “contingent character of rights in American society,”161 Margulies and Metcalf 
explain that a rights-based litigation approach is not likely to prove successful “for marginalized 
people with little political capital. To be effective, therefore, we must look beyond the courts and 
grapple with the hard work of long-term change with, through and, perhaps, in spite of law.”162  
Contemplating rejecting litigation as a tool of advocacy in the face of judicial resistance to 
minority rights arguments and undue deference to state security claims is not unique to the United 
States. In Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, civil rights groups and individual lawyers 
variously considered abandoning—or did abandon—litigation as tool, for fear that their efforts had 
the opposite of their intended effect—legitimating, rather than eliminating—the Israeli 
occupation.163 David Kretzmer observed that Israeli High Court opinions often sent the message 
that the military’s action had been vetted and were found, by an independent body, to comply with 
the rule of law.164 Such rulings had the effect of softening the Israeli position in the eyes of the 
                                                 
160 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay 
on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 363–70 (2010). 
161 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 440 (citing STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF 
RIGHTS 5 (2ed. 2004)). 
162 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 440 (citing Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: 
Critical Leal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 393–94 (1987)). 
163 See MICHAEL SFARD, THE WALL AND THE GATE: ISRAEL, PALESTINE, AND THE LEGAL BATTLE 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 21–24; 30–36 (2018). 
164 DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE 
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 2–3, 197–98 (2002); see also JOHN REYNOLDS, LEGITIMISING THE 
ILLEGITIMATE: THE ISRAELI HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, 
AL-HAQ (2010). 
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world, as well as bestowing legitimacy on the actions to the Israeli public and military.165 While 
in some instances, the Court’s review resulted in ameliorating the harshest effects of policies, the 
opinions also bestowed legal legitimacy so as to avoid politically confronting the issue of, and thus 
solidified, the occupation.166   
But the litigation critics are not absolutists. Waldron acknowledges that litigation may serve as 
a necessary tool to confront racial or religious pathologies.167 Further, Tushnet’s critique serves to 
elevate methodological consciousness rather than eliminate litigation as a tool.168 And Margulies 
and Metcalf do not entirely despair of litigation so much as they call for a broader and more 
effective approach.169 (Margulies in particular has been at the forefront of post-9/11 litigation 
advocacy). Finally, in the almost two decades since Kretzmer voiced his critique, lawyers continue 
to challenge the Israeli occupation in court, albeit mindful of litigation’s limitations and potentially 
corroding and legitimating effects.170 The following section accordingly addresses the arguments 
in favor of litigation with an eye toward fashioning a hybrid approach to challenging executive 
power and the related discounting of marginal group rights. 
                                                 
165 See KRETZMER, supra note 164, at 2–3; SFARD, supra note 163, at 21–24, 30–36; REYNOLDS, 
supra note 164, at 45 (asking “whether continued involvement with the [High Court of Justice] 
simply assists in strengthening the occupation, and on a broad community level, works against the 
human rights causes being fought for”); Ronen Shamir, “Landmark Cases” and the Reproduction 
of Legitimacy: The Case of Israel’s High Court of Justice, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 783 (1990) 
(contending that Israeli High Court of Justice’s rulings “legitimized Israeli rule over the 
territories”). 
166 See KRETZMER, supra note 164, at 197–98; Shamir, supra note 165, at 783.  
167 See Waldron, Judicial Review, supra note 2, at 1352. 
168 See TUSHNET, supra note 155, at 137–41. 
169 See Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 463–64. 
170 See SFARD, supra note 163, at 450 (characterizing “litigation as the most effective tool in the 
fight for human rights in the context of the occupation”); id. at 452 (concluding “that the active 
cost of High Court losses and participation in its proceedings has diminished over the years”).   
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III. THE CASE FOR LITIGATION  
The argument in favor of litigation is straightforward. A civil-rights lawyer’s obligation is to 
aid her client, protect the client from illegitimate constitutional and statutory violations, and uphold 
the Constitution itself, which may include arguing in favor of institutional alignments in the form 
of constitutional separation of powers. Particularly when her client faces deportation, removal, 
detention, or other infringements of personal liberty, a lawyer may have little recourse but to seek 
legal protection even at risk of the underlying policy’s ultimate judicial vindication.171 Given the 
client’s vulnerable posture, a lawyer would not be doing her job were she to not consider and often 
pursue injunctive relief, seeking to stay or enjoin executive actions that may disrupt family units, 
send people back to dangerous environments, or detain them. To swear off litigation or particular 
forms of litigation might well constitute legal malpractice and/or moral bankruptcy.172   
The situation many a civil-rights advocate faces may entail pursing a litigation route that will 
possibly benefit her individual client while producing “bad law” that may adversely affect others. 
In Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 173 counsel for Abdullah al-Kidd filed a civil lawsuit over his sixteen-day 
detention, alleging that the attorney general had authorized a policy of improperly holding 
terrorism suspects under the material-witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144, when it lacked sufficient 
evidence to otherwise charge them.174  The Court held that such detention based on a valid warrant, 
                                                 
171 As Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard observes, “A human rights worldview does not 
condone sacrificing the individual for the greater good (especially when the good is speculative 
and indirect).” Id. at 451. My mentor and great civil-rights lawyer Larry Lustberg would often say, 
“If you are winning all your cases, you aren’t taking the right cases.”  
172 See MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT. R. 1.3 Diligence – Comment, Client-Lawyer Relationship 
[1] (“A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required 
to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”); SFARD, supra note 163, at 451. 
173 563 U.S. 731 (2011). 
174 Id. at 734. 
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regardless of improper motive, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.175 The Court could have 
avoided making this ruling under the qualified-immunity doctrine and simply held that the law 
was not clearly established at the time, thereby affording Attorney General Ashcroft immunity.176 
But, the Court reasoned, correcting the lower court’s holding “ensures that courts do not insulate 
constitutional decisions at the frontiers of the law from our review or inadvertently undermine the 
values qualified immunity seeks to promote.”177 Though the Court arguably expanded the legal 
justifications for detention under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. al-Kidd, the individual detained for 
sixteen days, ultimately received compensation from the government—an impossible outcome 
without litigation.178 
Litigation also may be the least-worst option given the political branches’ disinclination to 
restrain the Executive.179 Litigation does enjoy its successes, particularly within the lower 
courts.180 And its critics may exaggerate litigation’s failures, the legitimacy adverse opinions 
enjoy, and their contagion-effects.181 
                                                 
175 Id. at 740 (“Because al-Kidd concedes that individualized suspicion supported the issuance of 
the material-witness arrest warrant; and does not assert that his arrest would have been 
unconstitutional absent the alleged pretextual use of the warrant; we find no Fourth Amendment 
violation.”). Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority’s characterization. Id. at 748 n.1 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“Nowhere in al-Kidd’s complaint is there any concession 
that the warrant gained by the FBI agents was validly obtained.”). 
176 See id. at 747–49 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (questioning need to address 
constitutional claims); see id. at 751–53 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (same). 
177 Id. at 735. 
178 See Richard A. Serrano, Muslim American caught up in post-9/11 sweep gets an apology, L.A. 
TIMES, (Feb. 14, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detainee-apology-
20150214-story.html. 
179 See infra Part III.A. 
180 See infra Part III.B. 
181 See infra Part III.C, E. 
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A. The Only-Branch Option 
However unsuccessful one views the litigation endeavor in the national security sphere, there 
appear few other options in the face of an even-more-deferential legislative branch. Advocacy 
routes that appeal to the majoritarian, representative branch are likely to meet even less success 
than those initiated in the courts for at least four reasons. First, Congress has seemingly accepted 
that the Executive retains the most expertise in the national security sphere and is the most 
functionally equipped to act. Indeed, Congress has also acceded to the view that congressional 
limitations may encumber the President when it needs the utmost discretion to make swift 
decisions and act decisively. Witness the scant declarations of war and Congress’s resistance to 
crafting a new authorization for use of military force subsequent to the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.182 
Second, and much related, Congress has invested the President with significant authorities: 
ceding emergency powers, delegating enforcement and implementation authority, and has granted 
greater latitude to pursue national security and intelligence priorities.183 That delegation is in full 
                                                 
182 See Barbara Salazar Torreon & Sofia Plagakis, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces 
Abroad, 1798-2018, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ii (Dec. 28, 2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf (noting there have been eleven war declaration relating 
to five distinct wars: War of 1812; Mexican-American War; Spanish-American War; World War 
I; and World War II); Fred Kaplan, Congress Needs to Take Responsibility for America’s Wars, 
SLATE (May 23, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/05/aumf-congress-
syria-barbara-lee.html (observing that Congress “has relapsed into passivity, letting ‘the imperial 
presidency’ resume,” by failing to amend or repeal the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force, on which three presidents have relied for nearly 18 years to justify military operations in 
one dozen countries).  
183 Raising concerns over national security and unlawful migration, President Trump recently 
invoked congressional grants of emergency authority under sections 201 and 301 of the National 
Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-51 (in addition to asserting executive authority under Article 
II) to declare a national emergency at the southern border and direct military forces to assist the 
Department of Homeland Security and utilize construction authority under 10 U.S.C. § 2808. 
Proclamation 9844, “Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Southern Border of the 
United States,” (Feb. 15, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 4949. Though Congress terminated the emergency 
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view in the immigration context where The Muslim-Ban Case plaintiffs unsuccessfully challenged 
the Proclamation as exceeding the authority Congress delegated to the President.184 
                                                 
declaration by joint resolution, President Trump vetoed that unusual legislative defiance. Jacobs, 
supra note 11. Civil-rights advocates, in addition to other plaintiffs, including 16 states, have now 
challenged the national emergency declaration. See, e.g., Sierra Club et al. v. Trump et al., 
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief , No. 3:19-CV-00892, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2019), 
https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/1-main.pdf. See also Priscilla Alvarez 
& Joyce Tseng, Tracking the legal challenges to Trump’s emergency declaration, CNN POLITICS 
(Apr. 23, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/20/politics/national-emergency-declaration-
lawsuit-tracker/index.html (describing and providing links to six pending lawsuits over the 
President’s national emergency declaration). For many of the reasons discussed within this 
article—and under the reasoning of The Muslim-Ban Case—litigation over the President’s national 
emergency declaration is likely to receive the Supreme Court’s imprimatur. President Trump 
predicted a litigation trajectory over the emergency declaration similar to that of The Muslim-Ban 
Case: 
[T]hey will sue us in the Ninth Circuit, even though it shouldn’t be there . . .  And 
we’ll possibly get a bad ruling and then we’ll get another bad ruling and then we’ll 
end up the Supreme Court, and then hopefully we’ll get a fair shake and we’ll win 
in the Supreme Court, just like the ban. 
Mark Moore, Trump bashes lawsuit from ‘Radical Left’ states over national emergency 
declaration, N.Y. POST, (Feb. 19, 2019, 8:55 AM), https://nypost.com/2019/02/19/trump-bashes-
lawsuit-from-radical-left-states-over-national-emergency-declaration/ (quoting President Trump); 
See also Aziz Huq, Has the Supreme Court Already Decided the Wall Case?, POLITICO MAGAZINE, 
(Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/02/19/trump-national-
emergency-border-wall-225164 (noting parallels with The Muslim-Ban Case and the latter’s 
“predictive quality”). Congress has provided the President with scores of other laws to invoke in 
asserting emergency powers. See ELIZABETH L. GOITEIN,  TRUMP’S HIDDEN POWERS, BRENNAN 
CENTER FOR JUSTICE,  (Dec. 5 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/trump-hidden-powers 
(locating 136 existing statutory authorities for president to declare national emergency and noting 
that Congress has not rescinded such powers over past 40 years); BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, 
A GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS AND THEIR USE, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legislation/Emergency%20Powers_Printv2.pdf 
(tables listing legal frameworks, statutory authorities, and conditions for president’s declaring 
emergencies); Elizabeth Goiten, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers, THE 
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/presidential-
emergency-powers/576418/. 
184 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2410–11 (rejecting arguments that the Muslim ban “countermand[s] 
Congress’ considered policy judgments” concerning alien entry given legislated vetting systems 
and Visa Waiver Program). 
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Third, Congress responds to popular pressures to ensure security.185 As a result, most anti-
terrorism or national security legislation will meet the perceived needs of the majority but may 
slight minority groups’ interests.186 A majoritarian branch of government is not as likely to concern 
itself with how executive actions or statutory enactments disadvantage smaller groups or non-
constituents.187 
Fourth, the Court’s 2015 opinion in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II) raises 
questions whether Congress may properly limit the President’s power in the foreign relations 
context.188 Though advocates and courts may construe the opinion narrowly,189 Zivotofsky II 
                                                 
185 See JOHN MUELLER & MARK G. STEWART, PUBLIC OPINION AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, 
CATO INSTITUTE 1 (2018) (“Public opinion is the primary driver behind the extensive and excessive 
counterterrorism efforts undertaken since 9/11, and officials and elites are more nearly responding 
to public fear than creating it.”). 
186 Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1458–59; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: 
BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 214–17 (2005). 
187 Numerous scholars, however, contend that judges are also susceptible to prejudice and bias 
when confronted with matters involving national-security policies impacting historically 
marginalized groups. See Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1431–42 (discussing 
impact of cognitive errors on judicial fact-finding in the terrorism context); Christina E. Wells, 
Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 119 (2005) (“[L]eft 
to their own devices in times of stress, people, including judges, tend to vastly exaggerate and react 
against the threats posed by disfavored groups.”); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s 
Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1443, 1452–54 (2010) (“[T]he subjective, common sense standard applied by the judiciary 
will likely tilt towards mainstream, majority group views that include a dose of skepticism towards 
claims of invidious discrimination against minority groups, particularly unpopular, insular ones.”). 
188135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094, 2096 (2015) (holding that Congress has exclusive “power to recognize 
foreign states and governments and their territorial bounds” and that “Congress cannot command 
the President to contradict an earlier recognition determination in the issuance of passports”). 
189 The opinion may permit a limiting gloss, acknowledging that, apart from the President’s 
“formal power to recognize a foreign government . . . Congress has an important role in other 
aspects of foreign policy, and the President may be bound by any number of laws Congress enacts.” 
Id. at 2088. 
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affords the executive branch “arguments for presidential exclusivity in a case that holds that the 
President can ignore a foreign relations statute.”190 
The civil-rights advocate also cannot put much stock in the Executive’s own self-restraint. A 
“trust us” approach is entirely at odds with the distinct branches of government embedded in the 
Constitution’s first three articles.191 The Constitution does not abide such blind faith. Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in The Muslim-Ban Case, in which he calls on President Trump to act in 
a measured fashion (“It is an urgent necessity that officials adhere to these constitutional 
guarantees and mandates in all their actions, even in the sphere of foreign affairs.”), but maintains 
that “the statements and actions of Government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or 
intervention,” underscores how anemic the check.192 Even a self-imposed “Executive due 
process,” as envisaged by the Obama administration, for example, cannot satisfy the civil-rights 
advocate who seeks to protect marginalized community members.193 Here, one would cede to the 
Executive an adjudicative function, leaving it to evaluate its own security interests—a state of 
                                                 
190 Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112, 
114 (2015). 
191 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The Government of the 
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”); Steven 
Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435, 444 (1999) (“Civil 
government is first and fundamentally the rule of law: where men may not be judges in their own 
case; where there is government of laws, not of men.”). 
192 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy was well aware of how little 
comfort the international community might feel in light of the unfettered discretion that the Court 
provided President Trump. See id. (“An anxious world must know that our Government remains 
committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom 
extends outward, and lasts.”) (emphasis added). 
193 See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, 
N.Y. TIMES, (May 29, 2012) https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-
war-on-al-qaeda.html (describing Justice Department Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) targeted-
killing memo as concluding that Due Process Clause “could be satisfied by internal deliberations 
in the executive branch.”). 
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affairs no less incompatible with constitutional separation of powers or the historical account of 
unchecked Executive treatment of minority groups.194 
B. Litigation’s Successes 
The account of litigation as a host of good intentions imperiling the Bill of Rights may be 
overstated. Civil-rights advocates can point to marked successes in the lower courts.195 Many 
litigation efforts appear unmitigated victories, in which lower courts vindicated the individual’s 
rights or struck down the national security or immigration policy in whole or in part.196 In many 
                                                 
194 Others forms of Executive self-checking are no more satisfactory. Though some scholars 
suggest that the OLC may limit Executive power by providing “objective and accurate legal 
interpretation” to the President, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal 
Legal Constraints of Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1596 (2007), others view 
skeptically the potential for such independent advice, considering the  OLC a more political 
position; see Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney 
General, 60 STAN L. REV. 1931, 1933–36 (2008). See also Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory 
Responsibility for the Office of Legal Counsel, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 269, 274 (2012) 
(describing “the aspirational view that the job of the Attorney General is to be an independent, 
impartial interpreter of the law. . . [and] the historically based or realist view that the Attorney 
General and OLC attorney can be considered a legal policy figure”). Acting Attorney General 
Sally Yates’s refusal to defend President Trump’s first executive order authorizing the Mulsim ban 
was highly unusual, both for her refusal to implement the President’s policy but also because she 
was a temporary office holder—not a presidential appointee. Lizza, supra note 127. President 
Trump subsequently fired her. Such internal defiance is unlikely to occur with great frequency. 
195 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Trump Is Losing His War Against The Courts, SLATE (Nov. 20, 
2018, 5:25 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/donald-trump-losing-courts-
jurisprudence.html (noting “the massive and consequential [lower court] rulings against this 
president and his administration that are logged every week and rarely viewed in the aggregate,” 
including within the national security-immigration contexts). 
196 See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 289–92, 301 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding 
Muslim plaintiffs’ allegations that New York City Police Department engaged in intensive and 
widespread surveillance of them based on their religious identity satisfy standing-injury 
requirements and must overcome “heightened equal protection review”). Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 
745, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (requiring that government provide 72 hours’ notice prior to transferring 
detainee from one country to another); Jonathan Hafetz, U.S. Citizen, Detained Without Charge 
by Trump Administration for a Year, Is Finally Free, ACLU (Oct. 29, 2018, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/detention/us-citizen-detained-without-charge-trump-
administration-year (reporting that due to litigation and as part of settlement agreement 
government released American client detained for more than one year). 
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of these cases, the government settled, did not appeal, or the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
leaving these victories in place.197 A civil-rights advocate cannot ignore these realistic 
possibilities. 
Litigation success also cannot be measured by one metric. Litigation has various objectives 
apart from systematic change or injunctive relief. Civil-rights advocates have sometimes obtained 
information about government practices and ensured transparency and accountability through 
discovery and Freedom of Information Act lawsuits.198 Litigation also may draw out government 
positions in argument and briefing that had previously gone undisclosed. Lawsuits also may result 
in settlements, softening a government policy’s impact or securing monetary compensation for an 
injured client. In addition, courts may issue temporary relief that may mean all the difference for 
a detained client and her family. 
Even when litigants ultimately lose in the Supreme Court, advocates may secure important 
victories for marginalized groups’ interests through the legal process, earning short-term reprieves, 
ranging from forestalling detention to temporarily restraining a policy’s implementation to a 
nationwide injunction. In some instances, legal challenges and initial victories at the lower-court 
                                                 
197 See, e.g., Hassan, 804 F.3d 277 (Government did not petition for certiorari.); Doe, 889 F.3d 
745 (same). 
198 See 5 U.S.C. § 552; CIA Releases Dozens of Torture Documents in Response to ACLU Lawsuit, 
ACLU (June 14, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/news/cia-releases-dozens-torture-documents-
response-aclu-lawsuit. FOIA litigation in the national security context has, however, enjoyed very 
limited success due in part to over-classification and the Act’s exemptions for national security. 
See David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act, 165 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1097, 1118–23 (2017); id. at 1121 (“FOIA has proven so profoundly unresponsive to the 
rise of national security secrecy—and therefore to the rise of government secrecy—that we might 
even say there is an element of transparency theater in the conceit that the Act secures the people’s 
right to know.”). 
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stages may impel the government to moderate or alter its policies, achieving benefits for affected 
clients and potentially securing the program’s constitutional footing.199   
The Muslim-ban litigation and related cases fit within the account of mixed success.  
Immediately following the first Executive Order’s issuance, civil-rights advocates initiated legal 
challenges, resulting in near-unanimous judicial victories for the plaintiffs. The most important net 
result was in enabling people to gain entry to the United States and the unification of families. The 
nationwide injunctions halted the order’s impact everywhere and for significant periods of time—
hardly an incremental or negligible legal interference. Ultimately, the government altered both its 
legal position and the content of the ban in responses to the successive litigation victories.200 
As a result of the legal fight against the Muslim ban, the Court’s eventual ruling addressed a 
policy very different from the initial order President Trump signed almost eighteen months earlier. 
The legal fights thus significantly mitigated many of the ban’s most pernicious aspects, spared 
hundreds of individuals’ deportation and denial of entry, and reinforced the rule of law and role of 
the judiciary.201 In this respect, civil rights litigants might view the litigation process—if not the 
Supreme Court’s decision and opinion—a success.202  
Yet regardless of a court’s holding, constitutional litigation that challenges policies such as the 
Muslim ban is “a powerful publication of dissent,” articulating “fundamental principles of law and 
                                                 
199 See GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT, supra note 5, at 178, 195.  
200 See supra discussion Part I.F. 
201 See Lind, supra note 109 (“[T]he policies in the ban have changed substantially. And it’s hard 
to deny that the current version of the ban is much, much more moderate than the first.”). 
202 See id. (describing the litigation as “a victory for the ban’s opponents” because “courts (perhaps 
inspired by the resistance in the streets) forced the administration to keep its ambitions within the 
scope of what was legally permissible, and the administration complied.”). 
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broader conceptions of the public good.”203 The legal dispute and resolution of competing 
constitutional principles and underlying values “can provoke broader discourse about the moral 
controversies of the day.”204 The Muslim-ban litigation provides a counter-narrative to national 
                                                 
203 Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A 
Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 871–72, (2002). Civil rights 
litigants often challenge legal precedents based on a dynamic and progressive view of the law. The 
posture fits well within the civil rights movement’s confrontation of legal shibboleths, 
encapsulating Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s aspirational phrase that “the arc of the moral universe 
is long, but it bends toward justice.” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., “Our God is Marching On,” 
STANFORD: THE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RESEARCH AND EDUCATION INSTITUTE, (Mar. 25, 
1965), https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/our-god-marching. In challenging the Muslim ban, 
numerous advocates and scholars contended that a more protective individual rights regime 
ushered in by the Warren Court could not abide nineteenth-century conceptions of government 
sovereignty that would permit discrimination in determining entry of aliens. See, e.g., Brief of 
Amici Curiae Immigration, Family, and Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Respondents 
at 12-14, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17–965), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-965/41696/20180330154938785_17-
965bsacImmigrationFamilyAndConstitutionalLawProfessors.pdf (arguing that Supreme Court’s 
changes to its domestic equal protection and fundamental rights jurisprudence favorably impacted  
its review of government’s immigration policies); Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban is Likely to be 
Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-
unconstrained-immigration-power/ (same). See also infra Part IV.C.4. Though the Muslim-Ban 
Case Court evaded fully confronting this idea of importing progressive domestic constitutional 
law to the national security and immigration context by characterizing the ban as “facially neutral,” 
the Court relied squarely on long-held ideas of sovereignty in limning its standard of review over 
aliens’ entry to rational basis. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418–20; id. at 2418 (“For more than a century, 
this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental 
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from 
judicial control.’”) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
204 Tsai, supra note 203, at 879. Importantly, judges identified with both political parties echoed 
the sentiment of respect for the law in response to President Trump’s attacks on the lower courts 
for their adverse rulings. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 858 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(Mem.) (Bybee, J., dissenting from the denial of reconsideration en banc):  
The personal attacks on the distinguished district judge and our colleagues were out 
of all bounds of civic and persuasive discourse—particularly when they came from 
the parties. It does no credit to the arguments of the parties to impugn the motives 
or the competence of the members of this court; ad hominem attacks are not a 
substitute for effective advocacy. Such personal attacks treat the court as though it 
were merely a political forum in which bargaining, compromise, and even 
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security prerogatives, maintaining that inclusive immigration and anti-discrimination should 
prevail over naked anti-Muslim prejudice and arbitrary use of and abuse of power. Failing to 
legally challenge national security policies may therefore undermine democratic deliberation, 
ceding to the government a self-serving and highly statist constitutional interpretation. 
President Trump’s overhaul of the judiciary also may not mean the complete eradication of 
civil rights claims in the national security and immigration contexts. Despite The Muslim-Ban 
Case, civil rights litigants have since enjoyed several victories in the lower courts concerning 
restrictive immigration policies such as migrant-family separation,205 limitations on judicial 
review of adverse asylum decisions,206 and limitations on locations where people may seek 
asylum.207 Even if these cases prove ultimately less successful in the Supreme Court, the short-
term victories may justify the litigation.  
C. Pyrrhic Losses  
                                                 
intimidation are acceptable principles. The courts of law must be more than that, or 
we are not governed by law at all. 
205 Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1141 (S.D. Cal. 2018), 
modified, No. 18-CV-0428 DMS (MDD), 2019 WL 1099789 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (enjoining 
Department of Homeland Security from separating migrants and asylum seekers from their minor 
children and ordering reunification). 
206 Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding statutory 
restriction on habeas review of negative asylum determination for arriving alien violates 
Suspension Clause). Compare with Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 
2016) (addressing similar circumstances and holding that arriving aliens did not enjoy 
constitutional rights and could not therefore seek protection under the Suspension Clause), cert. 
denied, 137 S.Ct. 1581, 197 L.Ed.2d 705 (2017). 
207 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining the 
President, DHS, and DOJ from implementing rules that would deny asylum to anyone who does 
not enter a specific port of entry), stay denied, Trump v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 139 S. Ct. 
782 (2018). The Supreme Court’s denial of a stay at the injunctive relief stage also may signal to 
the government that it may not enjoy success on the merits and lead it to amend its policy. 
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The Muslim-Ban Case’s legitimacy and adverse precedential effects may also be overstated. 
Future courts, commentators, society, and history may ultimately regard the opinion as distasteful 
and wrongly decided. Indeed, many scholars and jurists considered Korematsu—which The 
Muslim-Ban Case smugly overruled—mistaken and one of several stains on the Supreme Court’s 
history.208 Despite Justice Jackson’s admonition that the Court’s validation of “racial 
discrimination” and “transplanting American citizens . . . lies about like a loaded weapon, ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need,”209 
Korematsu has been more an epithet, part of an anticanon that even the most ardent advocates of 
presidential power omitted as legal support.210 The Muslim Ban Case may enjoy a similar legacy. 
But the line between canonical and anticanonical may be blurry, and a consensus may not emerge 
for decades. In the interim, The Muslim-Ban Case may realize Justice Jackson’s worry, in which 
the Muslim ban “becomes the doctrine of the Constitution” with “a generative power of its 
own.”211 
Critics also contest that the Court’s pronouncements on executive actions validate the 
Establishment Clause or Equal Protection violations or achieve a security-rights equilibrium.  
Baher Azmy questions first the methodological and empirical bases of Jack Goldsmith’s “legal 
legitimacy.”212 Azmy challenges the purported improvements or limitations on executive power, 
                                                 
208 See Jamal S. Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 398–402, 422–27, 456–60 (2011). 
209 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
210 See Greene, supra note 208, at 400 (observing “that at no time since September 11 has any U.S. 
government lawyer publicly used the Korematsu decision as precedent in defending executive 
detention decisions”). 
211 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
212 Baher Azmy, An Insufficiently Accountable Presidency: Some Reflections on Jack Goldsmith’s 
Power and Constraint, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 23, 27 (2012). 
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decrying the lack of accountability and transparency in the current system.213 But it remains the 
case that it was likely the very improvements to the first and second versions of the Muslim ban 
that civil rights advocates forced the President to make, which “normalized” the ban, possibly 
enabling a Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kennedy to uphold the ban.214  
Azmy also disputes the normative claims to legitimacy, which, Goldsmith argues, the current 
national security framework enjoys. Azmy does not perceive the Court as some Delphic Oracle, 
nor, he suggests, does the public. More specifically, he questions whether “judicial intervention 
provides a legitimating role in light of the public disapproval of judicial decisions such as Brown 
v. Board of Education (in the South), Roe v. Wade, or Kelo v. New London.”215 Moreover, Azmy 
condemns the “is-ought conflation” that Goldsmith’s analysis employs.216 Judicial review, as 
currently applied—and as Korematsu’s anticanonical legacy demonstrates—may not be 
legitimate; it is “insufficiently robust” and too deferential.217 
Azmy’s critique raises important question as to legitimacy: legitimate according to whom?218 
As he observes, Goldsmith—and the observation applies equally to Jackson, Black, and Bickel—
                                                 
213 Id. at 31–42. 
214 See Lind, supra note 109 (“The travel ban has been assimilated into normal political discourse 
and policymaking. It has become normalized, for better or worse.”). 
215 Azmy, supra note 212, at 48. 
216 Id. See also Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53–54 
n.146 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (“[T]he only deference due the Court’s 
authority is to refrain from direct resistance to its specific edicts. We are under no obligation . . . 
to relate our understanding of the law, and our projection of that understanding, to the Court’s 
interpretation.”) (discussing Abraham Lincoln’s views on the interpretive authority of Dred Scott) 
(citing Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)). 
217 Azmy, supra note 212, at 48. 
218 Tara Leigh Groves explains that the Court’s legitimacy (and hence their opinions) is variable, 
noting that several scholars “argue that members of the public tend to support the Court if it rules 
‘their way’ in salient cases.” Grove, supra note 149, at 12. See also id. (concluding form 
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address only “legitimacy within the U.S. constitutional system.”219 Azmy argues that this narrow 
view of legitimacy ignores the vital perspectives of victims, history, and the international 
community.220 Azmy’s insistence on forming legal meaning and legitimacy based on multiple 
perspectives is well taken. But in going to the Court, advocates necessarily succumb to the United 
States Supreme Court’s rhetoric and authority, for better or worse.221 The consequences for victims 
                                                 
scholarship that “if the Supreme Court repeatedly issues ‘conservative’ (or ‘progressive’) decisions 
in high-profile cases, its institutional reputation will eventually decline with the ‘loser’ group”). 
219 Azmy, supra note 212, at 60. 
220 See id. at 60–62. The international community is unlikely to view the opinion as legitimate. For 
a couple decades, foreign courts have looked less and less to the United States Supreme Court for 
guidance. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 766–68, 779–85 (2012) (noting decline in foreign courts’ 
citation to U.S. Supreme Court opinions, and attributing the disfavor to, in part, the country’s 
unique Constitution, including its brevity and lack of amendments); Adam Liptak, U.S. Court, Is 
Now Guiding Fewer Nations, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 17, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/18/us/18legal.html (documenting decline in international 
community’s citation to U.S. Supreme Court and possible explanations to include the Court’s 
conservative bent, the Court’s general resistance to citing foreign law, access to other national 
courts’ opinions, and the United States’s unfavorable international reputation).  
221 In the course of the Muslim-ban litigation, civil-rights advocates selectively drew from the 
courts’ holdings as sources of moral validity or invalidity. Compare Omar Jadwat, director of the 
ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project and counsel for several Muslim-ban plaintiffs, commenting 
on the government’s appeal of a district court’s order enjoining the ban (Mar. 17, 2017) (“President 
Trump’s Muslim ban has fared miserably in the courts, and for good reason—it violates 
fundamental provisions of our Constitution. We look forward to defending this careful and well-
reasoned decision in the appeals court.”) with Jadwat, commenting after defeat in Supreme Court 
(June 26, 2018) (“This ruling will go down in history as one of the Supreme Court’s great failures. 
. . The court failed today, and so the public is needed more than ever. We must make it crystal 
clear to our elected representatives: If you are not taking actions to rescind and dismantle Trump’s 
Muslim ban, you are not upholding this country’s most basic principles of freedom and equality.”). 
The comments also reflect the litigant’s dynamic perceptions of the courts’ institutional legitimacy 
and at least one post-litigation advocacy route and alternative source for legal meaning. And they 
align with Robert Cover’s skepticism that the Court’s interpretive authority should follow from its 
hierarchical position. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 216, at 43 (“The position that only 
the state creates law thus confuses the status of interpretation with the status of political 
domination. It encourages us to think that the interpretive act of the court is privileged in the 
measure of its political ascendance.”). 
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are inevitably severe, history’s verdict still waits, and the world’s opinion is of questionable 
relevance within the United States.222  
                                                 
222 Justice Kennedy anticipated an international backlash to the opinion and its vindication of the 
Muslim ban when he invoked “[a]n anxious world” in pleading to the President “to adhere to the 
Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  
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D. Opposition to Other Civil Rights Litigation 
Critics have long buffeted civil rights litigants’ focus on advocacy through the courts.223 
Numerous women’s rights and same-sex marriage advocates, for example, criticized litigation 
strategies and championed legislative approaches.224 These critics often eschewed litigation out of 
fear of an inhospitable Court (and thus unfavorable outcomes on the merits) and a belief that their 
causes would be better served by approval through a democratic, rather than anti-majoritarian, 
path.225 Arguably, the success at the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade226 and Obergefell v. Hodges227 
vindicate the litigation route. But some critics maintain that the larger social change sought by 
advocates in these areas would have been better served and secured through popular referendum 
and democratic process rather than through courts.228 
Criticism of other civil-rights advocates’ litigation focus enjoys, however, less salience for 
immigrants and other groups generally affected by national securities policies. Whereas some 
abortion and gay-rights advocates marshaled credible arguments that legislative advocacy, 
statewide appeals, and popular measures could achieve aims similar to those via lawsuit, these 
avenues may not prove as fruitful for immigrants and other groups targeted by national security 
                                                 
223 See supra Part. II. 
224 See, e.g., Ruth B. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. 
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 381 (1985). (“Roe ventured too far in the change it ordered. The sweep 
and detail of the opinion stimulated the mobilization of a right-to-life movement and an attendant 
reaction in Congress”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 431, 475 (2005) (cautioning that Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s same-sex marriage 
decision “may mobilize greater resistance than change accomplished through legislatures or with 
the acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions.”). 
225 Ginsburg, supra note 224, at 385; Klarman, supra note 224, at 475. 
226 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
227 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
228 Ginsburg, supra note 224, at 382. 
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policies. National-security and immigration litigation differs in at least three ways. First, state and 
local ballot or popular initiatives provide a less plausible forum for advocacy because most 
national security measures fall within the federal government’s exclusive authority. Second, 
Executive dominance over national security measures and legislative capitulation (even in areas 
such as immigration) may render appeals to legislatures less effective and useful. Third, the often 
reactive and clandestine nature of national security measures challenge popular efforts to embrace 
alternative policies. Finally, the rooted fear of minority groups attached to so many national 
security measures may prove a psychological obstacle to mobilizing an opposition. In this context 
litigation may be the best refuge. 
E. Overstating spillover risks 
Concerns that national security-related decisions will weaken domestic law and civil-liberties 
protections may be overblown. Advocates and judges are capable of distinguishing cases 
pertaining to immigration and national security from cases that feature domestic matters. Indeed, 
even judges who sympathize with executive prerogatives in the security and immigration context 
may exhibit greater skepticism when the issues address citizens or fall more clearly within a 
domestic law enforcement context.229 But fears over The Muslim-Ban Case’s transubstantive 
impacts are not unwarranted.230 
The Muslim-Ban Case reads as a vindication of the policy’s bigoted motivations, stating 
unequivocally that the nature of untrammeled executive power in the national security and 
immigration arena affords the President’s pretexts great latitude. It is again a victory of process 
over substance. Viewed in this light, the opinion, and the history of the litigation, may be read as 
                                                 
229 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (upholding citizen-detainee’s due process rights related to the 
battlefield). See also supra Part I.E (discussing post-Muslim-ban lower court opinions). 
230 See supra Part I.E. 
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a form of theater. The rule of law becomes a rhetorical device, in which the Court and courts have 
cajoled out of the presidency a limiting principle that amounts to: don’t be sloppy; don’t be too 
obvious. The Executive will receive a presumption of regularity for any of its policies—no matter 
the evidence of religious bigotry—provided the process appears legitimate on its face. But 
advocates have other strategies and resources to leverage in supporting non-citizens and other 
marginalized groups. 
IV. QUIETING THE COURT 
Advocates seeking systemic changes to particular social-justice issues must assess which 
approaches will prove most effective at social transformation. Tushnet suggests that if activists 
have “a choice between investing [their] resources in a legal strategy and investing in some other 
strategy, such as community mobilization through its churches . . .  it may make sense to avoid 
investing in a legal strategy even though the strategy would result in victories in court.”231 At base, 
such strategizing around the risks attendant to litigation informs advocates’ cost-benefit analysis. 
As a matter of resource allocation, Tushnet contends that “the cautions serve to improve the 
accuracy of the calculation of the possible benefit of investing in legal action rather than in 
something else—street demonstrations, public opinion campaigns, or whatever.”232 Considering 
these cautions and engaging in such calculations could prove vital to the success of advocacy in 
the national security context. 
Adopting Tushnet’s “cost-benefit” approach,233 advocates (legal and otherwise) confronting 
the national security apparatus on behalf of marginalized groups (often non-citizens of color) must 
                                                 
231 TUSHNET, supra note 155, at 137 n.22 (accompanying text at 216). 
232 Id. at 141 n.27 (accompanying text at 216). 
233 Id. at 137 n.22 (accompanying text at 216). 
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consider all advocacy strategies. Litigation cannot come off the table. There are, in particular, too 
many individuals targeted by the state whose liberty is jeopardized, and, who without immediate 
appeal to the courts, will suffer substantial and often irrevocable harms. Despite their critique of 
post-9/11 civil rights ligation, Margulies and Metcalf maintain that “lawyering (and even 
litigation) can make real differences in the lives of marginalized peoples.”234 In these instances, 
however, litigation should not be the only route.  
Multiple and varied forms of extralegal advocacy aimed at transformational change may 
support and inform direct representation and individualized litigation. These efforts should buttress 
or even alter the rights framework that underlies any judicial challenge.235 Advocates also should 
consider strategies that, given the Court’s likely resistance to overhauling a policy and the potential 
legitimizing of the policy, do not entail direct attacks.   
Margulies and Metcalf argue that lawyers and academics must reconceive the oft-litigated 
disputes over rights and ideal models of the state “as a battle over political resources and how they 
have been, and continue to be, mobilized to create narratives about national identity—an identity 
that is alternately threatened or calmed depending on the symbolic manipulation of unfolding 
events.”236 Advocates should therefore, when possible, exercise non-litigation strategies to 
establish narrative alternatives to the brittle individual rights framework that reflexively supports 
federal government policies restraining immigrant interests. Efforts should be undertaken at all 
                                                 
234 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 471. 
235 See id. at 471 (“As a beginning, scholarship should be more attuned to the limitations of the 
judiciary, and mindful of the complicated tendency of narratives to generate backlash and counter-
narratives.”). 
236 Id. at 463. 
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levels—media, public advocacy, electoral, and academic—to transform conceptions of identity 
and the relationships the American social contract undergirds.  
This section first addresses some discreet avenues within litigation that may avoid the Supreme 
Court’s validating reach. The section then proposes a new understanding of immigrant 
relationships to the state that may prove more resistant to xenophobic assertions of American 
identity rooted in the state institution as purveyor of security, and appeal to conservative segments 
of society that prize non-governmental institutions of family and religion. A framework that 
affirms our common humanity should prove less susceptible to nationalistic impulses and less 
subservient to powers deriving from national sovereignty. 
A. Revised Litigation Approach 
Working within the litigation realm, advocates should generally seek to maximize claims that 
will aid their particular client. However, they should resist efforts to dismantle national security 
policies through impact litigation.237 Courts may be more inclined to rule in favor of particular 
                                                 
237 Michael Sfard shares in his book a draft resolution that Israeli human rights attorneys and legal 
organizations collectively considered, but ultimately rejected, concerning their legal advocacy 
strategy in the Occupied Territories. SFARD, supra note 163, at 30–31. The draft proposed that an 
organization would not engage in public interest litigation before the High Court of Justice—aimed 
at altering or stopping policies and legislation—without collective organizational approval. 
Organizations could continue to file individual cases on behalf of clients relating to particular legal 
issues. The draft contemplated a collective organizational international legal strategy, from which 
any legal action would be subject to an organization’s approval. Id. see also REYNOLDS, supra note 
164, at 49 (discussing potential “comprehensive or partial boycott against the [High Court of 
Justice]” but noting the need to balance that strategy “against the losses suffered by Palestinians”). 
Sfard recounts how his legal organization, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, rejected the 
proposal but stated that it would employ “timely discretion with respect to the petitions we file to 
the High Court of Justice” with an emphasis on exposing the occupation’s “unacceptable 
fundamental assumptions” and “substantial human rights abuses.” SFARD, supra note 163, at 32. 
Sfard contends that boycotting the Court “could only have worked if all the relevant organizations 
had come on board.” Id. See also Aiken & Wizner, supra note 156, at 1008 n.41 (cautioning that 
impact litigation risks privileging lawyer and organizational interests over those of clients). 
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individuals and their particular case or controversy rather than a class action challenging a 
nationwide policy.   
Litigants also should attempt to domesticate their claims as much as possible, notwithstanding 
the national-security or foreign-affairs elements.238 Clients also may be better served by litigation 
strategies that do not focus on constitutional rights, animus, or separation of powers, but rather 
concentrate on factual underpinnings.239 Yet even when facts are contested, the Court is still more 
likely to accede to the President’s version.240 But litigants should prioritize cases with “good facts,” 
conscious of the aphorism that “bad facts make bad law.”241 Lawyers advocating in the courts 
should thus draft their complaints mindful of what facts may invite or enable the courts to build 
on the edifice of executive power and presidential discretion in the national security and 
immigration context.242   
The choice of constitutional claim also may make a difference in the Court’s analysis and 
outcome. For example, in The Muslim-Ban Case litigation, lawyers appeared to emphasize the 
                                                 
238 See supra footnotes 94-105 and accompanying text (discussing courts and scholars’ 
distinguishing of Hawaii based in part on its involving aliens seeking entry and alleged national 
security concerns). 
239 I am indebted to Andrew Pollis for this important strategic suggestion. See also Cox, Goodman, 
& Rodriguez, supra note 104. 
240 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422 (“[T]he Executive’s evaluation of the underlying facts is entitled 
to appropriate weight, particularly in the context of litigation involving ‘sensitive and weighty 
interests of national security and foreign affairs.’” (quoting Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 
at 33–34)); Cover, Presumed Imminence, supra note 3, at 1440–50 (describing how confirmation 
bias, availability heuristic, and probability neglect infect judicial fact-finding in the national 
security context in favoring government policies). 
241 Attribution for the common saying is hard to come by. Its judicial lineage appears to derive 
from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s statement that “[g]reat cases, like hard cases, make bad 
law.” Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
242 See, e.g., al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731; supra footnotes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing al-
Kidd and Court’s expanding bases for detention under the material witness statute based in part on 
majority’s view that plaintiff conceded warrant was validly obtained). 
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Establishment Clause claim over the Free Exercise Clause claim.243  Litigants—and as a result, 
the courts—may have focused on the Establishment Clause claim for at least three reasons. First, 
the initial executive order included a religious-minority exception to its ban on refugee admission, 
which appeared a thinly disguised preference for Christians.244 Coupled with the restrictions on 
entry by aliens from seven Muslim-majority nations, the order appeared to run most afoul of the 
Establishment Clause’s proscription to “make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”245 
However, the First Amendment’s religious clauses invariably “overlap,”246 with the Establishment 
Clause’s “prohibition of denominational preferences . . . inextricably connected with the 
                                                 
243 In opposing the government’s petition for certiorari, Hawaii raised the additional question, 
“Whether Proclamation No. 9645 violates the Establishment Clause.”  Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at i, 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
965/27771/20180112172848825_Trump%20v.%20Hawaii%20Brief%20in%20Opposition.pdf. 
Having ruled in Hawaii’s favor on statutory grounds, the Ninth Circuit had not addressed its 
constitutional claims. The Court directed the parties to brief and argue the Establishment Clause 
question as well. 
244 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977, § 5(b) (Jan. 27, 2017). Contemporaneous with the 
order, President Trump suggested he wanted to prioritize the admission of Christian refugees. See 
President Trump gives new hope to persecuted Christians, CHRISTIAN FREEDOM INT’L (Mar. 30, 
2018), https://christianfreedom.org/president-trump-gives-new-hope-to-persecuted-christians/ 
(quoting Interview by David Brody with President Trump, CBN NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www1.cbn.com/thebrodyfile/archive/2017/01/27/brody-file-exclusive-president-trump-
says-persecuted-christians-will-be-given-priority-as-refugees (“If you were a Muslim you could 
come in, but if you were a Christian, it was almost impossible and the reason that was so unfair, 
everybody was persecuted in all fairness, but they were chopping off the heads of everybody but 
more so the Christians. And I thought it was very, very unfair.”)). 
245 U.S. CONST. amend. I. However, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty argued in its amicus 
curiae brief to the Supreme Court that the parties and lower courts had wrongly addressed an 
Establishment Clause claim when the appropriate claim sounded under the Free Exercise Clause. 
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Neither Party at 
19–20, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17–965), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
965/38672/20180312184651975_Becket%20Amicus-Trump%20v%20Hawaii%20amicus%20-
%20as%20filed.pdf (“Put simply, government disfavor toward one religion does not—standing 
alone—establish another. But it does potentially violate free exercise.”). 
246 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). 
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continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause.”247 Though litigants included within their causes 
of action claims that invoked Free Exercise violations,248 complaints appeared to emphasize the 
Establishment Clause violation.249  
Second, litigants may have believed that Establishment Clause claims would more likely 
overcome standing hurdles than Free Exercise Clause claims.250 Establishment Clause claims may 
                                                 
247 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982). The Becket Fund contended that the Court’s later 
cases “treat Larson as essentially Free Exercise precedent,” which “is consistent with Larson’s 
application of strict scrutiny.” Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund, supra note 245, at 29 n.8 
(citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 536 (1993); Emp’t 
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). 
248 See, e.g., Third Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 
310-15, Does v. Trump, 328 F.Supp.3d 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (No. 2:17-cv-00178-JLR) (Nov. 
6, 2017), 2018 WL 1774089, https://www.aclu-wa.org/docs/third-amended-class-action-
complaint-declaratory-and-injunctive-relief-doe-et-al-v-trump (denominating Count One as “First 
Amendment – Establishment, Free Exercise, Speech and Assembly Clauses”); [Proposed] Third 
Amended Complaint, supra note 35 (asserting distinct Establishment Clause and Free Exercise 
Clause counts). 
249 See, e.g., Does, Third Amended Class Action Complaint, No. 2:17-cv-00178-JLR, supra note 
248, at ¶ 9 (“[T]he current set of orders remain in contravention of ‘[t]he clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause . . . that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another.’ Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)”); id. at ¶ 312 (“EO-3 and the October 2017 
Agency Memo violate the Establishment Clause by singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment. 
They have the purpose and effect of inhibiting religion, and are neither justified by, nor closely 
fitted to, any compelling governmental interest.”); id.  at ¶¶ 170-71, 177, 188, (describing examples 
of President Trump’s intent to preference Christian faith); Hawaii, [Proposed] Third Amended 
Complaint, No. 1:17-cv00050-DKW-KSC, supra note 35, at ¶ 108 (“[T]he orders require the State 
to tolerate a policy designed to disfavor the Islamic faith, in violation of the Establishment Clause 
of both the federal and state constitutions.”). ACLU Legal Director David Cole similarly stressed 
the Establishment Clause violation in his early statements on the Executive Order. David Cole, 
We’ll See You in Court: Why Trump’s Executive Order on Refugees Violates the Establishment 
Clause, JUST SECURITY, JAN. 28, 2017, https://www.justsecurity.org/36936/well-court-trumps-
executive-order-refugees-violates-establishment-clause/. 
250 See Kristen Waggoner, Symposium: Navigating animus and accommodation, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jun. 27, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-navigating-animus-
and-accommodation/ (speculating that Hawaii “likely wanted to take advantage of the fact that 
lower courts have created looser standing requirements for establishment clause claims — 
sometimes finding standing based on mere spiritual and dignitary injury”); Ira C. Lupu, Peter J. 
Smith, & Robert W. Tuttle, The Imperatives of Structure: The Travel Ban, the Establishment 
Clause, and Standing to Sue, TAKE CARE (Apr. 3, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-
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permit an observer to challenge the offending government policy whereas Free Exercise claims 
would require a showing of personal harm.251 Moreover, the more generalized bases for standing 
and structural protections afforded by the Establishment Clause make it less susceptible to 
challenges relating to the personal protections the Constitution affords to aliens outside the United 
States.252  
Finally, the plaintiffs may have thought they were more likely to succeed on the merits because 
a mere showing of an establishment of religion would violate the Constitution, regardless of the 
                                                 
imperatives-of-structure-the-travel-ban-the-establishment-clause-and-standing-to-sue (“Whether 
or not such claims of injury [stigmatization and separation from family members] are sufficient 
for standing to press other types of claims, the more capacious doctrine under the Establishment 
Clause should permit standing here.”). 
251 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge expenditures 
under the Establishment Clause); Van Order v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (addressing 
Establishment Clause claim brought by a person who frequently “encounters” Ten 
Commandments on the state capitol grounds). See also Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) (“[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the 
Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that 
particular religious freedoms are infringed.”).  
252 See Lapu, Smith, & Tuttle, supra note 250 (contending that Establishment Clause “addresses 
the character of government independent of any particular claim of rights” and thus may protect 
non-citizens’ “rights”). In his concurrence, Justice Thomas appeared to reject any Free Exercise 
Clause claim concerning aliens seeking entry to the United States, perhaps validating the litigants’ 
prioritizing the Establishment Clause claim. See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“The plaintiffs cannot raise any other First Amendment claim, since the alleged 
religious discrimination in this case was directed at aliens abroad.” (emphasis added.) (citing 
United States v. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)). 
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government’s security interests.253 In addition, the relief would be systemic overhaul rather than 
piecemeal and personal to each plaintiff’s injury.254 
But the plaintiffs might have fared better had they received a more fulsome hearing on their 
Free Exercise Clause claims. Had they been able to show that they suffered distinct injuries caused 
by the ban, such as the denigration of their faith and exercise of religion with family members, the 
Court might have subjected the claims to a strict-scrutiny analysis.255 Such a balancing of interests 
might have provided the Court with a “compromise between the per se violations characteristic of 
                                                 
253 See McCreary Cty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 (2005) (quoting 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“[W]hether government action has ‘a secular 
legislative purpose’ has been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of our [Establishment 
Clause] cases.”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1277 (2017) 
(“Once a practice . . . is judicially determined to be an establishment of religion, the case is over.  
Competing government interests play no part.”); Waggoner, supra note 250 (“Hawaii surely knew 
that domestic establishment clause violations are typically treated as per se improper. No strict 
scrutiny. No balancing of interests. That would have provided an easy way to circumvent the 
national-security interests asserted by the government.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund, 
supra note 245, at 30 (“‘Establishment Clause violations . . . are usually flatly forbidden without 
reference to the strength of governmental purposes.’” (quoting Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 
534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (McConnell, J.)). 
254 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund, supra note 245, at 29 (describing scope of 
Establishment Clause remedy to include invalidating Proclamation as “far broader than necessary 
to provide relief to the specific plaintiffs before the courts” under the Free Exercise Clause). 
Compare Carl H. Esbeck, Differentiating the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, 42 J. 
CHURCH & STATE 311 (2000) (“Because of its structural character, the task of the Establishment 
Clause is to limit government from legislating or otherwise acting on any matter ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion.’”) with id. at 320 (“[T]he redressing of a personal harm to an individual’s 
religious belief or practice is the Free Exercise Clause’s only function.”). 
255 See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (“A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of 
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.”); Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
Becket Fund, supra note 245, at 31 (contending that “under the more appropriate Free Exercise 
Clause analysis, courts should analyze whether the order is neutral and generally applicable and 
then, if appropriate, apply strict scrutiny to determine its constitutionality”). But in Larson, the 
Court did apply strict scrutiny to an Establishment Clause claim. Larson, 456 U.S. at 245.  
Compare with Brief Amicus Curiae of the Becket Fund, supra note 245, at 29 n.8 (arguing the 
case should be treated as Free Exercise Clause precedent). 
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the establishment clause and the excessive deference characteristic of rational basis.”256 To be 
sure, such speculation is just that; it is impossible to know how the Supreme Court would have 
ruled on a Free Exercise Clause claim. 
Litigants will generally assert any non-frivolous claims in the hopes that something will obtain 
relief for their clients. The Court’s prior machinations to find in favor of the Executive—which 
included finding the Proclamation was neutral—suggest that the Court would have similarly 
manipulated the Free Exercise Clause standards.257 Yet the potentially distinct treatment of 
religious clause claims underscores the need for litigants to strategize in selecting their initial 
claims, which claims to emphasize, and which to appeal or decline to appeal. 
The request for relief also may inform the judicial outcome. The nationwide injunction 
illustrates the dilemma a civil-rights attorney faces.258 On behalf of a single litigant, the 
immigration or civil-rights lawyer need not seek such relief. But as a matter of ceasing a draconian 
policy inveighing on thousands of people’s interest, it is logically and legally supportable. Yet 
demanding such relief identifies well for the court many of the tensions the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area reflects.259 A nationwide injunction dramatically expands a single district 
                                                 
256 Waggoner, supra note 250. 
257 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[T]his Court has engaged in a circumscribed judicial inquiry 
when the denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights of a U.S. citizen”). 
258 Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to include  the question, “[w]hether the global 
injunction barring enforcement of the travel ban is impermissibly overbroad,” Brief in Support of 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at I, 
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-
965/26928/20180106115022487_Trump%20v%20Hawaii%20Revised%20Petition.pdf, Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (granting certiorari), the Court deemed it unnecessary to decide 
the issue. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
259 See id. at 2429 (Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting arguments that nationwide injunctions 
“ensure that individuals who did not challenge a law are treated the same as plaintiffs who did, 
and . . . give the judiciary a powerful tool to check the Executive Branch” as improper policy 
judgments that “are [in]consistent with the historical limits on equity and judicial power”). 
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judge’s powers over the parties before her to apply to “the universe of persons who might be 
subject to enforcement.”260 It multiplies one client’s power in the national security and 
immigration context and transforms a single case into a disputation on a national policy.261 For the 
Supreme Court this may appear judicial hubris that the Court will be tempted to pull back and 
restrain.  
Bringing only a statutory claim may also avoid the wider fallout that asserting a constitutional 
claim may elicit.   Whereas the former implicates only the validity of a specific and limited 
legislative fiat, the latter invites a pronouncement on the constitutional system, rights, and 
governance. But more cautious litigation restricted to statutory claims may not increase chances 
of success and only delay the inevitable constitutional claims.  Such constitutional avoidance may 
not be possible at the Supreme Court level, nor may it always be prudent lawyering.262 Moreover, 
defendants may raise constitutional claims in defenses or in arguments so it is not a full-proof 
solution. 
Litigants also should not be too proud or focused on policy transformation to reject settlements. 
Once under the “court’s shadow”263—the ever looming possibility of an adverse ruling, or 
interlocutory orders to disclose sensitive and embarrassing information—the government may 
settle and grant a requested reprieve or remedy. The role of the client may mitigate the lawyers’ 
                                                 
260 Howard Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions are Really “Universal” Injunctions and They 
Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 338 (2018).  
261 Id. Class-action lawsuits may similarly raise concerns over judicial policymaking. See MARTIN 
H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE CLASS ACTION 
LAWSUIT 41, 46, 61 (2009). 
262 See Brief in Opposition, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, supra note 243, at i, (raising Establishment 
Clause violation for Supreme Court review despite the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on solely statutory 
grounds, presumably to better insulate it from an adverse ruling).  
263 KRETZMER, supra note 164, at 3. 
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fixation on policy change. But not always. Clients too may seek such transformation and the lawyer 
may be beholden to the client. In using these varied litigant strategies, lawyers should work within 
the larger and extra-judicial context; supporting, but directing less, the larger project of social 
transformation and inclusion.  
B. Non-Judicial Approaches 
Prominent civil rights organizations’ incorporation of political campaigning, public education, 
lobbying, and digital advocacy all reflect the logical appeal of diversified, non-litigious 
advocacy.264 Yet the groups’ retention of litigation as a core tenet demonstrate that advocacy 
approaches are flexible and diverse; not as binary as Tushnet’s analysis suggests. Advocacy groups 
can walk and chew gum at the same time. Given the Court’s rooted support of the Executive and 
likely enduring antipathy to immigrant rights in the national security context, groups should 
marshal alternative approaches (and consequently shift resources) to change both thinking and 
thinkers.265  
                                                 
264 The ACLU, for example, describes its work on immigrants’ rights as including “targeted impact 
litigation, advocacy, and public outreach.”  Immigrants’ Rights, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights#act (providing information on immigrants, 
government policies, litigation, and opportunities for people to take action). See, e.g., Petition to 
Repeal Trump’s Anti-Immigrant Bans, ACLU, https://action.aclu.org/petition/repeal-trumps-anti-
immigrant-
bans?ms_aff=NAT&initms_aff=NAT&ms=190410_immigrantrights_noban&initms=190410_im
migrantrights_noban&ms_chan=web&initms_chan=web (“Now is the time to raise our voices and 
make clear that we will not allow the Muslim, refugee, and asylum bans in our America. Add your 
name demanding that Congress pass the NO BAN Act.”). 
265 An online video campaign offers a powerful non-litigation example of advocacy against the 
Muslim ban, which emphasizes the ban’s human impact in a visceral way, having “crowdsourced 
106 videos from Iranians, Americans, Iranian-Americans, Syrian-Americans, Syrians, Somalians, 
and Yemeni individuals who are affected by the ban.”  Travel Ban Through the Eyes of Those who 
are in it, INIT, https://in-it.com/travelban; Bob Ortega, Separated by the travel ban, these couples 
are taking to video to plead their case, CNN INVESTIGATES (May 28, 2019 11:08 AM), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/24/us/travel-ban-separation-video-campaign-invs/index.html. 
The campaign encourages people to call on Congress to conduct oversight, clarify the waiver 
process, and provide an immediate family exemption to the ban. Travel Ban Through the Eyes of 
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First, the Court’s deferential national-security analysis means that who holds the levers of 
power is of utmost importance—particularly the President.266 Presidential elections have profound 
consequences on the Supreme Court, the rest of the judiciary’s composition, as well as their likely 
rulings in the national-security-immigration sphere.267 Accordingly, advocacy groups should 
incorporate electoral strategies within their general efforts at transforming the national security-
immigration space.268 The theoretical conception of litigation as entirely non-partisan possibly 
delayed some groups from adopting overt political and electoral strategies.269   
Advocates should not, however, confuse or conflate partisan opposition to the Trump 
presidency with support for historically marginalized groups. Notwithstanding appeals to 
intersectionality and the record number of minority women elected in the 2018 mid-term elections, 
most politicians are unlikely to advocate non-citizen rights, particularly at times of perceived 
                                                 
Those who are in it. Groups such as America’s Voice offer additional approaches as it seeks “to 
harness the power of American voices and American values to enact policy change that guarantees 
full labor, civil and political rights for immigrants and their families,” including working with 
“faith-based” groups. MISSION STATEMENT, AMERICA’S VOICE, https://americasvoice.org/about-
us/. 
266 See John Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Supreme Court travel ban decision moves left’s fight with 
Trump from the courts to the ballot box, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2018), 
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/supreme-court-travel-ban-decision-moves-lefts-fight-with-
trump-from-the-courts-to-the-ballot-box; Hamid, supra note 11. 
267 The justices’ alignment in The Muslim-Ban Case evidences the electoral relationship to judicial 
outcomes with the familiar five Republican appointees comprising the majority and the four 
Democrat appointees joining in dissent. 
268 See, e.g., Shakir, supra note 11 (discussing ACLU’s first “serious” involvement in elections, 
attempting “to increase voters’ understanding and awareness of civil liberties issues”). 
269 See, e.g.,  IRS,  SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-
profits/other-non-profits/social-welfare-organizations (“An organization that has lost its section 
501(c)(3) status due to substantial attempts to influence legislation may not thereafter qualify as a 
section 501(c)(4) organization.”). 
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threat. The USA PATRIOT Act votes tallies—98-1 in the Senate; 357-66 in the House270—in a 
Democratically-controlled Congress immediately after the September 11 attacks demonstrates the 
nonpartisan allure of targeting out-groups’ rights in crises.271  
Second, advocates should build on the local interests that federal government overreach on 
immigration issues may present. The federal government’s primacy in anti-immigration efforts has 
also turned on its head the simplistically conceived liberal-centralized government, conservative-
local-and-state government alignments. Local legislative efforts may enjoy some limited success, 
as illustrated by local measures enacted relating to “welcoming” or “sanctuary” cities and limits 
on local law-enforcement cooperation with detainers.272 The support for these measures, while 
                                                 
270 See H.R.3162 - Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, CONGRESS. GOV.  BILL 
HISTORY- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD REFERENCES, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-
congress/house-bill/3162/all-actions?overview=closed&q=%7B%22roll-call-
vote%22%3A%22all%22%7D.  
271 See, e.g., PUB. L. NO. 107-56, §. 412 (Oct. 26, 2001), 115 Stat. 350-51, codified at 8 U.S.C. 
1226A (authorizing Attorney General to detain foreign nationals suspected of terrorism on reduced 
standards of suspicions (“reasonable grounds to believe”) and for initial seven-day periods and 
extended periods after immigration-related charges). 
272 By one count, more than 170 states, cities, and counties have laws, policies, or practices that 
limit cooperating with federal officials concerning information about, and access, to aliens within 
their jurisdictions for purposes of enforcing federal civil immigration law. See Bryan Griffith & 
Jessica M. Vaughan, Map 1: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and States, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION 
STUDIES (Updated Apr. 16, 2019), https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-and-States. For 
example, the Chicago Municipal Code, Welcoming City Ordinance provides “that immigrant 
community members, whether or not documented, should be treated with respect and dignity by 
all City employees.” City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 279 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Welcoming City Ordinance, § 2-173-005). The ordinance proscribes city employees from 
providing immigration status information to, or generally assisting, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement officials for detention purposes based only on civil immigration law. Id. (citing 
Welcoming City Ordinance, § 2-173-020, -030, -042). The Seventh Circuit upheld a district court’s 
injunction against the attorney general’s conditioning federal law enforcement grants on providing 
federal officials access to meet with aliens and notice of their release dates, which ran afoul of 
Chicago’s ordinance. Id. at 278–80. The court found that the city was likely to succeed on the 
merits because the attorney general lacked statutory authority to impose the conditions.  Id. at 283–
88. 
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often regionalized or localized, indicate fertile ground for some popular advocacy.273 Fostering 
more localized resistance to imposition of federal immigration mandates, in partnership with the 
local group chapters and religious group mobilization through refugee sponsorship, sanctuary sites, 
and protests, are vital forms of expression and transformation of the dialogue. The government’s 
national security policies have also rankled libertarian notions of government, providing 
potentially fertile ground for rethinking the state relationship to security and rights.274 Enabling 
these collective responses should aid targeted groups in escaping the narrow and stultifying 
confines of judicial precedent and the dry rhetoric of law.275   
Third, the most prominent civil rights groups should be willing to get out of the way of, or at 
least permit, nascent, organic, non-hierarchical non-groups a seat at the table if not the head. 
Widespread mobilization, whether emanating via online groups, places of worship, or on the street, 
is potentially more agile and responsive than is the law or the courts to extreme actions by the 
President.  Moreover, these more-representative advocacy groups need not be captive of dominant 
legal strategies and dominating legal strategists, i.e., lawyers. The rise of groups like Black Lives 
                                                 
273 Polling on the Muslim ban, however—while of questionable reliability—suggests opinions 
largely divide along partisan lines. See Grace Sparks, Americans Have Been Split on Trump's 
Travel Ban for a While, CNN POLITICS (June 26, 2018), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/politics/travel-ban-polling/index.html (describing varied poll 
results on Muslim ban). 
274 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae The Cato Institute in Support of Respondents at 1, Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/hawaiivtrumpamicus.pdf  
(describing “[t]he Cato Institute [a]s a nonpartisan public policy research foundation dedicated to 
advancing the principles of individual liberty, free markets, and limited government.”). 
275 Stella Elias describes these and similar state and local efforts as forms of “immigration status 
‘covering.’” Stella Burch Elias, Immigrant Covering, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 765, 831–41 
(2017). The positive consequences may include expanded “opportunities for immigrants . . . [in] 
education, employment, and access to goods and services,” “psychological benefits” due to allayed 
fears of deportation, and “treat[ment] on par with U.S. citizens.” Id. at 842–43. However, Elisa 
cautions, such “covering” laws are tainted by their “[i]mpermanence, vulnerability, and absolute 
reliance on the continued good grace of the majority.” Id. at 849. 
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Matters and Occupy Wall Street, which some characterize as a partial response to infirmities 
endemic to the traditional civil rights movement’s legalistic advocacy and top-down leadership, 
reflect the viability of the non-hierarchical approach.276 
These groups offer alternative narratives to the dominant legal discourse.277 Liberated from 
legal briefs and precedent, they provide various conceptions of liberty, community, nationality, 
culture, and identity. 278 Witness the power and prevalence of Shepard Farey’s “We the People” 
poster depicting a young woman in hijab made from an American flag.279 The image offers a 
                                                 
276 See, e.g., Barbara Ransby, Black Lives Matter is Democracy in Action, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/opinion/sunday/black-lives-matter-leadership.html; 
Jelani Cobb, The Matter of Black Lives, THE NEW YORKER (March 6, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/where-is-black-lives-matter-headed.  
277 See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1475, 1502–06 (2018) (describing varied forms of “[r]esistance to Muslim Bans 
outside of the courtroom”). See also Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 214, at 17–18 
(explaining that “diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the nation” challenge and 
influence the meaning of the “authoritative text” and that “exercises a destabilizing influence upon 
power”). 
278 See, e.g., AMERICA’S VOICE, supra note 265 (describing its mission as utilizing “the power of 
American voices and American values to enact policy change that guarantees full labor, civil and 
political rights for immigrants and their families.”); INIT, supra note 263 (“That’s why we decided 
to create a collective voice showing what the Ban means for the nationals of the banned countries 
and also expose how it is being implemented.”). 
279 See Amah-Rose Abrams, Shepard Fairey Releases ‘We the People’ Series to Protest Trump, 
ARTNET NEWS (Jan. 20, 2017), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/shepard-fairey-releases-we-the-
people-series-824468. According to the Amplifier Foundation’s website, “We the People is a 
nonpartisan campaign dedicated to igniting a national dialogue about American identity and values 
through public art and story sharing.” The campaign provided free images to download as “new 
symbols of hope to combat the rising power of nationalism, bigotry, and intolerance.” The 
campaign works “with change movements, educators, and innovative thinkers to bring We the 
People into schools and communities around the country.” ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN, AMPLIFIER, 
https://amplifier.org/campaigns/we-the-people/.  
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visceral, inclusive and patriotic vision of American identity distinct from the Court’s abstracted 
and parsimonious opinion.280 
281 
The potent image, which was held aloft in marches and protests following the President’s 
inauguration and afterward, challenges the “otherizing” of Muslims and Muslim women in 
particular.282 Rather than a clash of western and Muslim civilizations—a narrative heralded since 
the September 11 attacks283— and one of Trump’s supporting rationales for the Muslim ban284—
                                                 
280 Cover, Nomos and Narrative, supra note 216, at 11 (“[T]he creation of legal meaning—
‘jurisgenesis’—takes place always through an essentially cultural medium.”). 
281 ABOUT THE CAMPAIGN, supra note 279. 
282 Roaa Ali, The Women’s March that Welcomed the Hijab as a Sign of Dissidence: Pink, 
Rainbows, and an American-flag Hijab, INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY AND 
DIVERSITY Vol. 3, No. 1, at 4 (2017), http://journals.hw.ac.uk/index.php/IPED/article/view/51/32. 
283 Id. at 7.  
284 See Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees: Exclusive Interview with Donald Trump (CNN television 
broadcast Mar. 9, 2016, 8:00 PM) (“I think Islam hates us. . . we can’t allow people coming into 
this country who have this hatred of the United States . . . [a]nd of people that are not Muslim.”) 
(transcript available at https://goo.gl/y7s2kQ). 
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the image merges and celebrates Muslim and American identity. Roaa Ali identifies the 
simultaneously subversive and patriotic message the poster conveys: 
By appropriating the ultimate signifier of national patriotism, the American flag, as 
a signifier of religious identity that is visibly female; those Muslim women 
reclaimed their gender and religious identity as decidedly American. That stars-
and-stripes hijab is a political statement denoting that these women’s Muslim 
identity is not at odds with their American identity, nor are their bodies an offense 
to the national body.285  
 
But a greater shift is needed to normalize the hijab—Muslim identity—within American cultural 
and legal frameworks. That transformation must embrace a common humanity that transcends the 
dominant theories of the state and social contract. 
C. Finding National Identity in Family and Religion 
Margulies and Metcalf maintain that the legalistic battle over rights obscures the fight over 
national identity.286 Despite my skepticism over whether an actual national identity exists, the 
underlying observation and challenge are well taken. As this article has discussed, unchecked 
political power invariably wields its authority most negatively on non-citizens and minority groups 
during crises, permitting the height of political powers to adversely target those who are least-
represented and have the least rights. Thus, a more inclusive and extra-legal narrative is needed. 
1. Nationalistic Rights Theory 
The difficult rights terrain has its roots in social-contract theory, which is wedded to principles 
of sovereignty, a powerful executive to ward off invaders, and political society membership. The 
traditionally and legally confined definition of rights is therefore unlikely to avail non-citizens and 
marginalized groups in the national security context. Rethinking that rights framework may offer 
new ways of thinking about alternative narratives and legal consequences under which security-
                                                 
285 Ali, supra note 282, at 8. 
286 Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 117, at 463. 
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based fears do not inevitably translate into the state’s infringement of both minority group and 
non-citizens’ interests. 
A right may be defined generally as A’s freedom to exercise her liberty insofar as it is 
compatible with B’s freedom to exercise his liberty.287 These rights also may be defined in relation 
to the state, as in the Bill of Rights.288 Hobbes located in a “Common Power”—the Leviathan or 
mortal god—the only solution to humanity’s warring against itself and “invasion of 
Forraigners.”289 The people consented to the Common Power’s governance through mutual 
covenants with one another.290  
Locke’s conception of the state departs from Hobbes in that it operates under the familiar 
tripartite government framework (entailing “indifferent and upright judges” and use of force “to 
prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion”).291 But 
Locke still vested near-exclusive powers in the Executive relating to “war and peace, leagues and 
alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the 
commonwealth.”292   
Locke’s social-contract theory also envisions that people utilize the democratic process to 
realize “the peace, safety, and public good of the people,” which must include preserving liberty 
                                                 
287 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 216 (2011). Rules and laws 
regulate these persons’ relationships and their rights.  Id. at 203–04. 
288 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”). 
289 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 127 (1651). 
290 Id. at 128. 
291 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 259 (II, § 131) (1689). 
292 Id. at 268 (II, § 145). 
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and property.293 Yet they become subjects to “any earthly power” only through “express 
consent.”294 Any lesser relationship to a government, via “tacit consent”, which “foreigners” might 
enjoy through owning property, “makes not a man a member of that society.”295 Though Locke’s 
theory undergirds a rationale for resisting political institutions, it also defines the boundaries of 
the society’s membership and its attendant duties and rights. 
2. Family Members’ “Almost Natural Consent” to the State 
Locke recognized a latent ambiguity in his theory insofar as not every person in society could 
have expressly consented to its governance.296 Jeremy Waldron addresses the possible gap in 
membership by proposing a third form of “almost natural” consent to the political system, “in the 
sense that they have grown up with it and acquiesced in its development and in its authority at 
every stage.”297 So conceived, an “incrementalist,” evolutionary form of consent may cohere with 
a contractualist theory, even though “the whole process was not the subject of anyone’s intentions 
and that the overall direction of the development was unforeseen.”298 These notions of natural 
consent to membership and its obligations also should inform the development of rights held by 
those who did not formally assent to the political society’s governance.299  
Those in close or familial relationships to members hold potentially viable claims to 
membership and equal rights in that political society. In illustrating “natural consent” to an 
                                                 
293 Id. at 259 (II, § 131). 
294 Id. 253 (II, § 119). 
295 Id. at 255–56 (II, §§121-22). 
296 Id. at 145–46 (II, § 100). 
297 Jeremy Waldron, John Locke: Social Contract Versus Political Anthropology, 51 THE REVIEW 
OF POLITICS 3, 19–21, 23 (1989) (quoting LOCKE, II, § 75) [hereinafter Waldron, John Locke].  
298 Id. at 25 (emphasis in original). 
299 Id. at 20. 
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authority and formation of political societies, Locke’s anthropological account focused on the 
family example (“the government commonly began in the father”)300 and attributed early societies’ 
subsistence to “nursing fathers’ tender and careful of the public weal.”301 Waldron contends that 
one may employ the “almost natural consent” theory as “a way of characterizing a particular set 
of historical events, such as the gradual emergence of a polity out of a family.”302 Examining 
relationships between individuals and the state entails using “judgment to discern” whether people 
have consented so far as to satisfy Locke’s theory and thus enjoy the rights afforded by the political 
society.303 
Under the “almost natural consent” theory, we might determine that foreign family members 
and U.S. citizens enjoy relationships (“liberty interests”) such that the government should view 
favorably the former group’s admission to the United States. The role of family may assist in 
refashioning the rights framework, which will prove politically and morally acceptable in the 
national security-immigration context.   
The emphasis on family may also hold some appeal to some conservative and libertarian 
groups who tend to disfavor government intrusion.304 The family is a model subsidiarity—an 
associational group which fulfills social functions “‘not at the lowest possible level, but rather at 
                                                 
300 LOCKE, II, supra note 291, at 276 (II, § 105). See also Waldron, John Locke, supra note 297, at 
19–20. 
301 LOCKE, II, supra note 291, at 284 (II, § 110). See also Waldron, John Locke, supra note 297, 
at 19–20. 
302 Waldron, John Locke, supra note 297, at 25. 
303 Id. 
304 See, e.g., Abby M. McCloskey, Beyond Growth, 39 NATIONAL AFFAIRS (Spring 2019), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/beyond-growth?smid=nytcore-ios-share 
(observing that conservative vision recognizes “economy will be strong and inclusive only if it's 
built on a foundation of close ties among families and communities” rather than through 
government programs). 
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the right level.’”305 The notion of family and subsidiarity resists transferring all authority to the 
central government.  Dominic Burbidge advises “that the need to coordinate the pursuit of specific 
good in order to arrive at the common good is not a responsibility specific to the state.”306 Rather, 
“it is the family, which has the most direct line into the formation of the habits, manners and social 
mores that bring about the coordination of society’s parts.”307 And among these parts, which the 
family coordinates, is of course, religion.   
Thus to resist family unification on religious grounds implicates two core and interdependent 
features of one’s personal and collective identities; it is why the family and religion have long been 
seen as intertwined and fundamental to American identity.308 The Court’s refusal to recognize that 
the Muslim ban amounted to this two-fold violation of ideals and principles highly valued by the 
American social compact is tragic—particularly because it knew otherwise. 
3. Plenary Power 
Early court opinions on admitting foreign nationals to the United States are not pretty. They 
traffic in themes not all that distinct from Hobbes’ and Locke’s fears of invading “Forraigners,” 
powerful governance, and exclusive social membership even when the state’s interest is not 
security-related. Thus, in The Chinese Exclusion Case the Court readily deferred to Congress, 
                                                 
305 Dominic Burbidge, The Inherently Political Nature of Subsidiarity, 62 AM. J. JURIS. 143, 144 
(2017) (quoting Jonathan Chaplin, “Subsidiarity and Social Pluralism,” in MICHELLE EVANS & 
AUGUSTO ZIMMERMAN, ed., GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SUBSIDIARITY 72 (2014)). 
306 Id. at 158. 
307 Id. 
308 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding state may not compel Amish 
parents to send children to school until age 16). The Court in Yoder emphasized the importance of 
“traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor 
children” and that “an intrusion by a State [such as compelling the Amish to go to school] into 
family decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious 
freedom.” Id. at 231. 
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upholding its exclusion and expulsion of Chinese laborers who had left the United States prior to 
the passage of the relevant law:  
Those laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the 
government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, 
can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to 
controversy.   
. . . . 
If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, 
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their 
exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with 
the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. . . . [I]ts determination is conclusive 
upon the judiciary.309 
This plenary-power doctrine310—a political theory of state power and citizenship—enables a 
legal and political narrative that harbors racist, xenophobic and nationalistic instincts along with 
deference to the political branches.311 Thus the Court indulged the nativist and populist sentiments 
that Chinese “immigration was in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and 
was a menace to our civilization.”312 And in Korematsu, the Court revealed how tenuous are the 
legal protections for citizens of particular national or ethnic backgrounds when it deferred to the 
military’s judgment that, “[l]ike curfew, exclusion of those of Japanese origin was deemed 
                                                 
309 Chae Chan Ping v. U.S., 130 U.S. at 603, 606. 
310 See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The Plenary 
Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 ASIAN AM. L.J. 13 (2003) 
(discussing how plenary power doctrine affects ongoing jurisprudence). 
311 See Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (“During most of its history, the 
United States openly discriminated against individuals on the basis of race and national origin in 
its immigration laws.”). Hobbes echoes in this judicial deference, allowing little daylight between 
the state and the court’s legal interpretation. See HOBBES, supra note 286, at 128 (“[A]nd therefore 
the interpretation of all laws dependeth on the authority sovereign; and the interpreters can be none 
but those, which the sovereign, (to whom only the subject oweth obedience) shall appoint.”). 
312 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S., at 595. 
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necessary because of the presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, 
most of whom we have no doubt were loyal to this country.”313 
The Muslim-Ban Case Court’s adoption of the Kleindienst v. Mandel standard of review cannot 
be easily separated from the latter opinion’s xenophobic and judicially-enervating origins. Mandel 
relied heavily on The Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting v. United States and the plenary 
power doctrine314 in holding that it would “not look behind” the Executive’s denial of entry to a 
foreign person implicating an American citizen’s First Amendment right to receive information 
and hear ideas, when the government acts “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide 
reason.”315 As Justice Douglas wryly noted in his dissent, “[t]hese cases are not the strongest 
precedents in the United States Reports.”316 
4. Communitarian Immigration Principles 
But both before, and certainly after, Mandel there has been a rising legal and collective 
consciousness that non-citizens form an integral part of the nation, quite apart from an express 
consent or citizenship status, and merit constitutional and judicial protections.317 As courts 
                                                 
313 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218–19. 
314 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766 (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581; 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)); Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766 (“The Court 
without exception has sustained Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the admission of 
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” 
(quoting Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118 (1967)). 
315 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. 
316 Id. at 781. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581; Fong 
Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 698). 
317 See Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 
79 (2017) (“[C]ommentators have been discussing the ‘demise’ of plenary power for decades.”); 
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 566 (1990) (“By the 1950’s, aliens’ rights 
decisions beyond the scope of immigration law already conflicted with assumptions implicit in the 
plenary power doctrine.”); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. 
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recognized the rights of individuals in the domestic context, including those of minorities and in 
particular aliens, it became harder to rationalize not affording fundamental rights to those persons 
seeking admission to the country.318 
Monumental changes in constitutional law, as expressed in the prohibition on racial 
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education319 and following developments in civil-rights laws 
challenged discriminatory classifications restrictions on non-citizens’ entry.320 Similarly, alien-
focused decisions such as Plyer v. Doe,321 which held that, on equal-protection grounds, Texas 
could not deny non-citizen children a public education, recognized that citizenship alone could not 
be a basis for acceptance into American society and provision of legal rights.322   
                                                 
L. Rev. 1, 49 (1984) (attributing changes in immigration law to “the emergence of new, 
‘communitarian’ public law norms”). 
318 See Cox, supra note 207 (“[T]he Supreme Court has never upheld an immigration policy that 
openly discriminated on the basis of race or religion during a period of constitutional history when 
such a policy would have been clearly unconstitutional in the domestic context.”); Motomura, 
supra note 317, at 566; Schuck, supra note 317, at 49. 
319 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
320 Motomura, supra note 314, at 566; Cox, supra note 205. 
321 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
322 See Motomura, supra note 317, at 584 (“Plyler recognized the membership of these 
undocumented children in American society as an accomplished fact, and further recognized that 
they could not be excluded by fiat from constitutional rights and privileges.”); Schuck, supra note 
317, at 54 (Plyler “may mark a fundamental break with classical immigration law’s concept of 
national community and of the scope of congressional power to decide who is entitled to the 
benefits of membership.”).  Just one year prior to The Muslim-Ban Case, the Court again accepted 
the progressive influence of domestic constitutional law on immigration classifications, holding 
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited requiring different durations for fathers and mothers’ 
presence in the United States in determining U.S. citizenship of children born abroad to unwed 
parents. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). There, the Court rejected arguments 
that Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), which concerned immigration entry-preferences for non-
citizen children born to mothers, and its “minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review)” should apply. 
Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693. Whereas, Fiallo entailed “Congress’ ‘exceptionally broad 
power’ to admit or exclude aliens,” Morales-Santana’s claim was that of a U.S. citizen, thus 
requiring heightened scrutiny under established constitutional law. Id. at 1693-94 (quoting Fiallo, 
430 U.S. at 792). The Court has also recognized that an alien’s presence—even unlawful—within 
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The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 also reflected this same tendency, 
introducing principles of non-discrimination that are at the heart of The Muslim-Ban Case. In 
signing the INA into law, President Johnson explained that its purpose was to alleviate the “harsh 
injustice of the national origins quota system.”323 Reflecting the national moment of turning from 
anti-discriminatory policies, Congress passed the INA “alongside the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”324 As part of its anti-discrimination design, INA, § 1152(a)(1)(A) 
reads: “no person shall . . . be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because 
of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”325   
Immigration policy’s preferences for family reunification go back almost a century.326 But in 
eradicating the national origins quotas, the 1965 Amendments further clarified the prioritization 
of family relationships in allocating family-sponsored immigrant visas.327 The current provision, 
INA, § 1153, prioritizes allotting visas to (1) unmarried sons and daughters of citizens; (2) spouses 
and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of permanent resident aliens; (3) married sons and 
married daughters of citizens; and (4) brothers and sisters of citizens.328 
                                                 
the United States provides the person greater legal protections than one who has not yet entered 
the country. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (holding detention of 
removable alien exceeding six months presumptively unreasonable). 
323 See President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, Liberty 
Island, New York, 546 Pub. Papers 1037, 1038 (Oct. 3, 1965), http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-
baines-johnson/timeline/lbj-on-immigration. 
324 Olsen, 990 F.Supp. at 37. 
325 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A). 
326 William A. Kandel, U.S. Family-Based Immigration Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE,  2 (Feb. 9, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43145.pdf.  
327 See President Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Immigration Bill, supra note 320, at 1038 
(“This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to immigrate to America shall be 
admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship with those already here.”). 
328 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a). 
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In its review of the plaintiffs’ statutory claims, The Muslim-Ban Case Court rejected the 
legislative emphasis on nondiscrimination and family preservation in issuing immigrant visas. 
Ignoring Congress’s more recent expressions of fundamental American values, the Court held that 
the ban was a proper use of presidential authority under INA, § 1182(f), to “suspend the entry of 
all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens 
any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”329 Revealing its hand early, the Court stated that 
the statute “exudes deference to the President in every clause.”330 The Court proceeded to reject 
arguments that the President must provide “sufficient[ly] detail[ed]” findings that would allow for 
judicial review.331 The Court also rejected the notion that the anti-discrimination statute could be 
read so broadly as to apply to the President’s authority to suspend entry based on nationality.332 
Nowhere does the Court even reference the judicial and legislative watersheds that had 
commentators poised to bury the plenary power doctrine.333 
More than three decades ago, Peter Schuck asked whether these same judicial and legislative 
developments reflected “communitarian” principles that “the government owes legal duties to all 
individuals who manage to reach America’s shores, even to strangers whom it has never 
                                                 
329 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f). 
330 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2408. 
331 Id. at 2409. 
332 Id. at 2413–15. 
333 Following The Muslim-Ban Case, members of Congress introduced bills that would, among 
other things, amend 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) to include prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
religion in visa and entry decisions, and amend 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) to limit the President’s 
suspension-of-entry power by clarifying that § 1152(a)(1)(A) applies, requiring factual findings, 
and imposing congressional notification and consultation requirements, as well as void all 
executive orders and proclamations constituting the current Muslim ban.  H.R. 2214, 116th Cong. 
(Apr. 10, 2019); S. 1123, 116th Cong. (Apr. 10, 2019). 
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undertaken, and has no wish, to protect.”334 Schuck suggested that the expansion of government 
duties and emphasis on group rights planted the seeds for broadening conceptions of national 
identity and related rights and duties.335 Recognizing that “individuals, societies and nations are 
bound to each other by pervasive interdependencies”, Schuck derived the following “moral and 
legal consequences” for society:  
[S]ocially accepted values should augment consent as a basis for imputing legal 
duties; that the conception of national sovereignty should be weakened in order to 
define the relationship between the United States and aliens in terms of morally 
significant, informal social interactions; and that membership in our national 
community should depend not upon formalistic criteria but upon the functional 
social linkages actually forged between aliens and the American people.336 
 
Familial relationships, as recognized in the INA’s family-reunification preferences, provide 
the “almost natural consent” and “social linkages” with Americans for imposing duties on the 
government’s treatment of non-citizens seeking entry to the United States. The Muslim-Ban Case, 
however, demonstrates that the Court still operates under the racist and xenophobic vestiges of the 
plenary power doctrine, ignoring universal anti-discriminatory principles and resists 
accommodating and expanding the national community through affording protections to American 
Muslim citizens whose family members have been denied entry. 
5. Judicial Betrayal of Family and Religion 
The Muslim-Ban Case most profoundly disappoints in its failure to keep faith with the 
protections Congress affords immigrant family members and the protections the Constitution 
                                                 
334 Schuck, supra note 317, at 4. Justice Breyer has similarly suggested that globalization and 
international interdependence call into question some legal citizen-alien distinctions. BREYER, 
supra note 3, at 85 (“[I]n a world of extensive travel and immigration, of worldwide commerce, 
and of the Internet, the ‘foreignness’ of an alien is not quite what it used to be.”).  
335 Schuck, supra note 317, at 49. 
336 Id. at 50. 
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guarantees religious minorities. The Court’s ambivalence concerning foreign family relationships 
was on display in the 2015 Kerry v. Din opinion. Justice Scalia penned a plurality in which he 
declared: “Only by diluting the meaning of a fundamental liberty interest and jettisoning our 
established jurisprudence could we conclude that the denial of the non-citizen spouse Berashk’s 
visa application implicates any of Din’s fundamental liberty interests.”337 Justice Kennedy (along 
with Justice Alito) would have assumed the spouse had such a liberty interest. but found that the 
notice of visa denial satisfied due process.338 Dissenting for the four-member minority, Justice 
Breyer recognized a person’s liberty interest in “the freedom to live together with her [foreign 
national] husband in the United States” and instead would have found the visa denial did not satisfy 
procedural due process guarantees.339  
The Scalia-Breyer dispute over liberty interests concerning foreign family member 
relationships fits within the familiar debate over the meaning and sources of constitutional rights. 
For Scalia, “claims to any implied fundamental rights” are suspect because they are “textually 
unsupportable” and “‘outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.’”340 Scalia 
pointedly discounts Congress’s “‘continuing and kindly concern . . .  for the unity and the 
happiness of the immigrant family’” as “a matter of legislative grace rather than fundamental 
right.”341 Breyer would have held that the liberty interests in marriage and to live with her husband 
                                                 
337 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2136 (plurality opinion). 
338 See id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. (“Today’s disposition should not be 
interpreted as deciding whether a citizen has a protected liberty interest in the visa application of 
her alien spouse.”). 
339 Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
340 Id. at 2133–34 (plurality) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). 
341 Id. at 2136 (plurality) (quoting EDWARD P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965 518 (1981)). 
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in the United States rested within the purposes and objectives of the Due Process Clause as well 
as legislative immigration provisions reflecting concern for the family unit.342   
Only eleven days after the Court issued its ruling in Din, the Court delivered Obergefell v. 
Hodges,343 upholding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage as vested in the Due Process 
Clause. There, Justice Kennedy explained how the right to marry “safeguards children and 
families,”344 and “allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family 
and its concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”345 The liberty 
interest in family unity would seem now established.  
At its heart though, a debate over the breadth of constitutional rights devolves into questions 
of whose interests. Recognizing the familial relationship’s significance not only invites a 
multiplicity of legal rights and meanings but invariably enlarges the society. 
These tensions roil just below the surface of The Muslim-Ban Case. The Court could not ignore 
the ban’s widespread disruptive impact on families. The Court initially gestured toward the 
significance of relationship with foreign family members in interlocutory orders. In partially 
granting a stay sought by the government, the Court held that the Muslim ban “may not be enforced 
against foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or 
entity in the United States.”346 The Court accepted that “a close familial relationship” could consist 
                                                 
342 Id. at 2142–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
343 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
344 Id. at 2590.  
345 Id. at 2600 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)). 
346 IRAP, 137 S. Ct. at 2088. The Court held that “for entities, the relationship must be formal, 
documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading [the ban].” 
Id. Relationships between a university and admitted student, and employer and employee, or an 
invited lecturer satisfied the Court’s criteria. Id. The Court later clarified, however, that the ban 
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of family members, including parents, children, siblings, “grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-
in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the United 
States.”347 But concern for maintaining the family relationship proved fleeting. 
Instead, the Court’s invocation of family became a Trojan horse. The Court accepted as a basis 
for standing the plaintiff  Dr. Ismail Elshikh’s allegations that, for example, the ban injured him 
“by preventing him from reuniting with his relatives,” but not by “denigrating him as a Muslim 
and an Imam.”348 The Court explained that it would not decide the spiritual and dignitary interest 
claim because the family-separation claims offers a “more concrete injury.”349   
Yet the Court immediately questioned whether the plaintiffs could establish an Establishment 
Clause violation because the ban does not apply to them, “but to others seeking to enter the United 
States.”350 This twist of reasoning is neither logical nor consistent with precedent. Parents may, 
for example, assert, along with their children, Establishment-Clause claims relating to statutes 
                                                 
would apply to refugees with formal assurances from resettlement agencies. See Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 1 (2017) (Order) (staying in part Hawai’i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).) 
347 Hawai’i, 871 F.3d at 658 & n.8; Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 1 (leaving intact Ninth Circuit’s elaboration 
on family relationships). The Court’s broad understanding of family rested on the “’the 
accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history’ 
that was worthy of constitutional protection.” Hawai’i, 871 F.3d at 658 (quoting Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977)). The Muslim-Ban Case majority also emphasized that 
the Proclamation’s waiver program, which may apply to “foreign national[s] seek[ing] to reside 
with a close family member” supported the “Government’s claim of a legitimate national security 
interest.” Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2422. 
348 Hawaii, Third Amended Complaint, No. 1:17-cv00050-DKW-KSC, supra note 35, at ¶ 110, 
111-14; Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416 (describing plaintiffs’ arguments that the ban “‘establishes a 
disfavored faith’ and violates ‘their own right to be free from federal [religious] establishments.’” 
(citing Brief for Respondents 27–28 (emphasis deleted)). 
349 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416. 
350 Id.  
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compelling the children to read the bible in public schools.351And the Court has long recognized 
the vital relationship between family and religion.352 
In arriving at its adumbrated, deferential review, the Court resisted its own seeming evolution 
on constitutional rights claims involving non-citizens’ entry to the United States. Six Justices in 
Kerry v. Din had endorsed “look[ing] behind” the government’s reasons denying admission to 
non-citizen family members when there was “an affirmative showing of bad faith.”353 But The 
Muslim-Ban Case majority adopted Mandel’s abstracted embrace of executive power over Din’s 
attention to family, discarding its potentially heightened standard when family interests are 
implicated in the immigration context.354 
                                                 
351 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9. The Schempp Court considered the parents “directly 
affected” by the state law, but family members within the United States are similarly “directly 
affected” by the ban. The “direct affect” accentuates the importance of religion to family and 
identity. 
352 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (“The Establishment Clause embodies 
a judgment, born of a long and turbulent history, that, in our society, religion ‘must be a private 
matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice. . .’”) (quoting Lemon, 
403 U.S. at 625); Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154, 
90 S. Ct. 827, 830, 25 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1970) (“A person or a family may have a spiritual stake in 
First Amendment values sufficient to give standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.”) (citing Schempp, 374 U.S. 203). Even secular “religious” 
events entwine the family. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (“When government 
decides to recognize Christmas day as a public holiday, it does no more than accommodate the 
calendar of public activities to the plain fact that many Americans will expect on that day to spend 
time visiting with their families, attending religious services, and perhaps enjoying some respite 
from pre-holiday activities.”). 
353 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141. 
354 Compare Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (“[O]ur opinions have reaffirmed and applied [Mandel’s] 
deferential standard of review across different contexts and constitutional claims.”), with id. at 
2440 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (maintaining that, under Mandel and Din, “‘an affirmative 
showing of bad faith,’” requires “looking behind the face of the Proclamation” (quoting Din, 135 
S. Ct. at 2141)). 
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The Court ultimately did not address whether the Establishment Clause’s scope provided a 
legal interest in the admission of foreign family members.355 But an Establishment Clause 
violation, as manifested in the government’s disfavoring a religion, invariably amounts to an attack 
on the family—its traditions, rituals, morality, and identity. The ban inhabits that destructive effect 
in its fullest form. The cruel irony is that the form of the Establishment Clause violation—its 
barrier on entry to foreign family members—is precisely what afforded the policy its deferential 
review and resistance to allegations of any religious animus.356   
The Muslim ban is therefore doubly pernicious. It simultaneously keeps Muslim-Americans’ 
family members outside the United States, rupturing their family and faith, and also tells them, as 
“members of minority faiths ‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community.’”357 Thus, Muslim citizens do not enjoy the same protections for their religious 
exercise as do citizens of other faiths.358  
The Court reinforced its message of religious bigotry through its decision in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,359 which it released only twenty-four days 
earlier. There, the Court held there that several Colorado Civil Rights Commissioner’s statements 
reflected animosity to religion such that they violated the Free Exercise Clause when they ruled 
                                                 
355 Id. at 2416. 
356 Id. at 2418–19, 2423. 
357 Id. at 2434 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290, 309 (2000)).   
358 Id. at 2446–47 (noting Court’s more exacting scrutiny of religious discrimination claim asserted 
by a Christian baker in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719 (2018)). 
359 138 S. Ct. 1719. 
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that a Christian bakery shop owner’s refusal on religious grounds to create a cake for a same-sex 
couple’s wedding violated the state’s anti-discrimination law.360   
Both Masterpiece and The Muslim-Ban Case addressed “whether a government actor exhibited 
tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that affects individuals’ fundamental religious 
freedom.”361 But in contrast to The Muslim-Ban Case, the Masterpiece Court rigorously reviewed 
the commissioners’ statements—fewer in number and less disparaging than the President’s tweets 
and press releases—for religious animus.362 The Masterpiece Court did indeed “look behind” the 
commission process, assessing “‘the historical background of the decision under challenge, the 
specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative 
or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decision 
making body.’”363 To be sure, the facts of that case took place squarely within domestic confines. 
But the Court’s wildly divergent standard of review in The Muslim-Ban Case “erodes the 
foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so emphatically 
                                                 
360 Id. at 1723–24.   
361 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Although Masterpiece and The Muslim-
Ban Case address distinct religious clause claims, the analysis should arguably be the same. See 
id. at 2442 (“[U]nder Supreme Court precedent, laws ‘involving discrimination on the basis of 
religion, including interdenominational discrimination, are subject to heightened scrutiny whether 
they arise under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection 
Clause.’” (quoting Colorado Christian Univ., 534 F.3d at 1266 (citations omitted))); Lukumi, 508 
U.S. at 534 (“The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial 
discrimination.”); id. at 540–41 (discussing how addressing neutral laws under either the Free 
Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause “‘requires an equal protection mode of analysis,’” 
which entails “determin[ing] the [law’s] object from direct and circumstantial evidence.” (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted)). The alternative view that invoking different religious clauses should receive 
distinct analysis is discussed at footnotes 218–32 and accompanying text. 
362 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–31.  
363 Id. at 1731 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540). 
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protected,”364 and compounds the message that some groups’ religions and their intimate liberty 
interests merit less protection than others.  
The cowardice of The Muslim-Ban Case lies in its refusal to champion Congress’s (the popular 
representative body) progressive opposition to discrimination and preferences for family cohesion 
in immigration as expressed in the INA, and to uphold the family’s integral role to religious belief, 
as protected by the Establishment Clause.365 The Court thus employed its rights analysis within a 
context of national security that immediately elevated the government interest and diminished the 
individual interest.366   
But if we reconceive national identity along “communitarian principles”367 and allow that the 
familial relationship is integral to our polity via “almost natural consent” and to the Establishment 
Clause, the weighing of interests may shift, at least to the extent that a court should review a 
policy’s hateful motivations. This is what the Court should have done when it considered not 
simply the interest of the adverse parties, but the “public interest”—“the possibility of a complete, 
                                                 
364 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
365 The Court also might have considered that the interests in family integrity and freedom from 
religious animus “reinforce each other” and therefore “heighten scrutiny of a claim that might 
seem at first to merit more deferential review.” Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration, Family, and 
Constitutional Law Professors, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, supra note 206, at 20-21 (citing Plyler, 
457 U.S. at 223; Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. 
L. REV. 1309, 1338–39 (2017)). 
366 This is the way rights are so often measured against one another. John Finnis explains that 
rights require “certain sorts of milieu—a context or framework of mutual respect and trust and 
common understanding which is physically heathy and in which the weak can go about without 
fear of the whims of the strong.” FINNIS, supra note 287, at 216. Rights may be restricted on the 
basis then of public morality or public order. Id. These principles could support greater security at 
the expense of individual rights. But so too could such principles or another rights framework limit 
and inform rights based on the sanctity of the human relationship.  
367 Schuck, supra note 317, at 49–50. 
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intact family to tens of thousands of Americans.”368 An even braver Court might also have looked 
beyond the family unit and considered the constitutional values and human relationships, which 
would prohibit the United States from denying entry on the basis of religion to all non-citizens, 
including refugees, regardless of familial connection to the United States.369 But that is not our 
Court. Advocates must look first to other forums in which to vindicate the universal and American 
values of nondiscrimination, religious freedom, protection of refugees, and family reunification. 
Only under the shadow of this new social contract should we expect the Court to heavily scrutinize 
the government’s exclusion of foreign family members and refugees.  
CONCLUSION 
Surveying the Supreme Court’s opinions during wartime, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
“While we would not want to subscribe to the full sweep of the Latin maxim—Inter Arma Silent 
Leges—that in time of war the laws are silent, perhaps we can accept the proposition that though 
                                                 
368 IRAP v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 271 (4th Cir.), as amended (Feb. 28, 2018), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710, cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2710 (citation 
omitted). 
369 A year prior to its final ruling in The Muslim-Ban Case, the Court showed its disregard for 
refugees, granting in part a stay of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that would have enjoined the ban 
against those refugees with formal assurances from a resettlement agency. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 1. 
These refugees had already undergone and cleared 18-to-24 months screening processes, which 
would have found they satisfied legal refugee-status, security, and medical requirements. Hawai’i, 
871 F.3d at 660. They also would have already established substantial connections to the United 
States. The Ninth Circuit explained that in reaching a formal assurance of location, resettlement 
agencies “consider whether a refugee has family ties in a certain locality, whether the local agency 
has the language skills necessary to communicate with the refugee, whether the refugee’s medical 
needs can be addressed in the local community, and whether employment opportunities are 
available and accessible.” Id. These connections also merited constitutional protection and 
meaningful judicial review. At the time, there were 23,958 refugees with these formal assurances. 
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the laws are not silent in wartime, they speak with a muted voice.”370 That is one view—a 
decidedly judicial view, entrenched in legal schema that favor a powerful executive and ignore 
marginalized victims. It is a judicial posture that has enabled the Court to embrace nationalistic 
xenophobia and racism in the name of security.371 But revising litigation and advocacy approaches 
to incorporate multiple perspectives of identity, community, and the state may overcome that 
judicial and legal stasis. Thus, in order to best preserve and protect marginalized group members’ 
liberty interests—including such universal and American values as religion and family—advocates 
should not quit the Court, but quiet its voice.  
                                                 
370 Remarks of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 100th Anniversary Celebration of the Norfolk 
and Portsmouth Bar Association, Norfolk, Virginia (May 3, 2000), SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_05-03-00. 
371 Id. Rehnquist contended that judicial deference during wartime “represents something more 
than some sort of patriotic hysteria that holds the judiciary in its grip.” Id. But, as the foregoing 
demonstrates, the legal rights framework in which advocates contest security and individual 
liberties, accommodates and nurtures “patriotic hysteria” by prioritizing executive power and 
accentuating citizenship, and thus stigmatizes and delegitimizes non-citizen interests. 
